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In 2005, seventeen-year-old Regina Howard went to the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia to file a petition for a civil protection order against her
ex-boyfriend and the father of her child, Marcus James.1 Marcus and Regina
constantly fought after their daughter was born, and those fights escalated into
Marcus beating Regina on a weekly basis. Regina decided to seek a protection
order after Marcus punched, kicked, and strangled Regina until she passed out
in front of their daughter. When she attempted to file her petition, however, the
clerk turned Regina away and told her that she was not permitted to file
without a parent. At the time, D.C. law did not address whether or under what
circumstances a minor could obtain a protection order. Regina’s friend told
her that she obtained a protection order in D.C. before she turned eighteen
without parental involvement, so Regina decided to try again. It was only after
her third attempt—and after a lawyer heard about her case and offered to assist
her—that Regina was able to file her petition and obtain a protection order. If
Regina had not possessed unshakable determination, she would have remained
unprotected.
In 2009, fourteen-year-old Karen Carson sought a civil protection order with
her mother’s assistance against her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, John Brown,

1. Based on a case handled by Women Empowered Against Violence (WEAVE). Names
changed to protect confidentiality.
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after he beat and raped her.2 It was undisputed that the parties shared a dating
relationship. The trial court concluded that John’s conduct amounted to
domestic violence and issued a civil protection order for Karen’s safety, which,
among other things, ordered John to transfer to a new high school. The
Washington Court of Appeals vacated the order, holding that John’s conduct
could not qualify as domestic violence under Washington law until Karen was
at least sixteen years old.3 Being only fourteen, Karen had no right to legal
protection.4
Since its emergence in the late 1970s,5 domestic-violence law has evolved
considerably. Due to the tireless work of activists, courts’ and communities’
views of whether men have a right to beat women and whether the law has a
role to play in addressing intimate partner violence have seismically shifted.6
Systems have been developed to make courts more accessible and legal
protections more readily available to persons subjected to abuse.7
The issue of teen dating violence emerged against this backdrop. Activists,
researchers, and scholars demonstrated the prevalence of abuse in teens’
intimate relationships and argued that the same legal protections and social
services developed to assist adults should also be extended to teens.8 Several
state legislatures and courts responded by enacting laws that enhance the
protections available to abused teens.9 Despite these positive advances, teens
still face substantial obstacles when they seek legal protection from abuse,
especially when they approach the courts unaccompanied by a parent or
guardian.10 States must do more to recognize the issue of teen dating violence
and guarantee teens the same access to justice that states have accorded adults
subjected to domestic violence.
This Article builds on the work of previous scholars to focus more intently
on the ways in which states continue to deny abused minors access to justice.
Part I of this Article explores the problem of teen dating violence in the United
States. This Part particularly examines the prevalence, severity, and lasting
impact of dating violence on teens and teens’ common reticence to disclose
2. Name changed to prevent further publication of sensitive information. Published case
decision on file with the author.
3. Washington’s civil protection-order statute was subsequently changed to grant
individuals thirteen years of age and older the right to seek protection orders against dating
partners. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(b) (West Supp. 2011).
4. Id. § 25.50.010(h) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).
5. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 354 (2008).
6. See Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Call for Reform, 23 YALE & POL’Y REV. 93, 98–100 (2005).
7. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2009).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1.
10. See infra Part IV.
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abuse to adults. The combination of these traits makes teen dating violence a
highly dangerous, yet largely invisible phenomenon. Part II considers the civil
protection-order remedy in the United States—the legal remedy most
commonly pursued to address abuse in adult relationships—and analyzes the
benefits of civil protection orders for teens subjected to abuse. Part III
explores the extent to which state statutes make protection orders more or less
accessible based on age. Specifically, this Part focuses on three features of
statutes that control teens’ access to protection orders based on their status as
minors: standing, legal capacity, and parent notification. Part IV analyzes how
protection-order statutes exclude teens based on age by denying or failing to
explicitly grant teens standing, denying or failing to explicitly grant teens legal
capacity to pursue cases independently, and mandating parent notification or
involvement in protection-order cases. Moreover, this Part argues that to best
protect teens, protection-order statutes must unambiguously extend standing
and legal capacity to teenagers without requiring parent notification. Part V
argues that although ambiguous statutes often are interpreted to exclude teens
from protection, several legal principles support extending standing and
capacity rights to teens under ambiguous laws. Part V offers strategies to
assist teens in securing legal protections in the many jurisdictions that do not
extend protections to them explicitly. Finally, Part VI concludes by
recommending how states can reform protection-order statutes to increase
abused teens’ access to justice.
I. TEEN DATING VIOLENCE: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Dating violence is all too common in teen relationships. In recent years, as
many as twenty-five to thirty-five percent of teen girls report that their intimate
partner physically, sexually, or emotionally abused them.11 Sixty percent of
teens report knowing a peer in an abusive dating relationship.12 Adolescent
11. See Jay G. Silverman et al., Dating Violence Against Adolescent Girls and Associated
Substance Use, Unhealthy Weight Control, Sexual Risk Behavior, Pregnancy, and Suicidality,
286 JAMA 572, 572 (2001) (reporting that twenty-five percent of adolescents admit to having
experienced physical or sexual abuse in a teen dating relationship); see also LIZ CLAIBORNE, INC.
& FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT 2009: IMPACT OF THE
ECONOMY AND PARENT/TEEN DIALOGUE ON DATING RELATIONSHIPS AND ABUSE 12 (2009)
[hereinafter TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT], available at http://www.maryfonden.dk/
Files/System/pdf/Teen_Dating_Abuse_Report_2009.pdf (reporting that twenty-nine percent of
teens admitted to having been the victim of actual or threatened sexual or physical abuse by a
partner in a dating relationship, forty-seven percent reported having an intimate partner who
exerted controlling behaviors, twenty-four percent reported having been the victim of abusive
behavior by an intimate partner via technology, and eleven percent reported experiencing verbal
abuse by an intimate partner); Antoinette Davis, Interpersonal and Physical Dating Violence
Among Teens, FOCUS, Sept. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/
2008_focus_teen_dating_violence.pdf (estimating that up to thirty-three percent of adolescent
girls are victims of violence in intimate relationships).
12. TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 13 (reporting that sixty percent of teens
know a peer who has been the victim of actual or threatened sexual or physical abuse, eighty
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women are among the most likely to experience abuse.13 According to a
Bureau of Justice study, women of ages sixteen to twenty-four experience the
highest rates of violence by current or former intimate partners.14 Intimate
partner violence can be particularly devastating to teens because it can have
negative long-term impacts. Teens who have experienced abuse are more
likely to use alcohol, tobacco, and cocaine, drink and drive, exhibit unhealthy
weight control behaviors, take greater sexual risks, become pregnant, and to
attempt or commit suicide.15
Teens may have particular difficulty freeing themselves from abusive
relationships for many reasons, including inexperience, peer pressure, fear of
retribution, and reluctance to seek help.16 First, simply by virtue of their age,
teens are relatively inexperienced in romantic relationships.17 A teen who
experiences abuse in her first relationship might mistake violence or
controlling behaviors for love.18 This may be particularly likely for teens who
have witnessed the abuse of a parent.19 Moreover, children who witness

percent know a peer who dated someone exerting controlling behaviors, fifty-one percent
reported having known a peer victim of abusive behavior via technology, and eleven percent
know a peer who has been victimized by verbal abuse from an intimate partner).
13. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-99, at 1, 3 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipva99.pdf.
14. Id.; see also Nancy Chi Cantalupo, How Should Colleges and Universities Respond to
Peer Sexual Violence on Campus? What the Current Legal Environment Tells Us, 3 NASPA J.
ABOUT WOMEN HIGHER EDUC. 49, 52 (2010) (explaining that women attending college between
the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are four times more likely than other groups to be sexually
assaulted and usually know their perpetrators).
15. Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 577–78; see also HOLLY HARNER, VAWNET,
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ADOLESCENTS 7 (2003), available at http://vawnet.org/Assoc_Files
_VAWnet/AR_Adolescent.pdf.
16. Stacy Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 331, 337 (1995).
17. See Robert J.R. Levesque, Dating Violence, Adolescents, and the Law, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 339, 350 (1997) (explaining that teen relationships are often marked by “highly
passionate, exciting, and possessive” feelings, which adolescents are unable to control).
18. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 337 (“Many teenagers believe that occasional violence is
a normal part of relationships and that the violence is a sign of love.”); Pamela Saperstein, Teen
Dating Violence: Eliminating Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders, 39 FAM. L.Q. 181,
186 (2005) (noting that because teens have more limited dating experience, “they often cannot
identify characteristics of an abusive relationship”); see also Dating Violence Information Sheet,
NEB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SEXUAL ASSAULT COALITION, http://ndvsac.org/wp-content/uploads
/DV/Dating%20Violence%20fact%20sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (reporting that “25%35% of teens equate jealousy, possessiveness and violence with love” (citing TEENAGE
RESEARCH UNLIMITED, LIZ CLAIBORNE, INC. OMNIBUZZ TOPLINE FINDINGS: TEEN
RELATIONSHIP ABUSE RESEARCH 7 (2005), available at http://loveisnoteabuse.com/c/document
_library/get_file?p_l_id=45693&folderid=726128&name=DLFE-207.pdf)).
19. See TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (detailing that sixty-seven
percent of teens who witnessed abuse between their parents had also experienced some form of
abuse in their own relationships).
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domestic violence are exponentially more likely to experience abuse in future
romantic relationships and to perpetrate abuse against romantic partners.20
Even if teens recognize that their relationships are abusive, they may feel
pressured to remain in such relationships because of peer expectations and
fears of social ostracism.21 As Carole A. Sousa describes:
Eager to separate themselves from adults and to belong among their
peers, adolescents often conform strictly to peer norms. . . . Peer
pressure can be intense, and the fear of being different or of violating
peer norms can create rigid conformity or enormous stress. The
norms of adolescent peer groups often support stereotypical
behaviors:
dominance
for
men
and
passivity
for
women. . . . Confusion about intimacy and the idealization of
relationships based on gender stereotypes can lead victims and
perpetrators to conclude that it is acceptable for males to use force in
relationships.22
Apart from peer pressure, experiencing abuse in an intimate relationship
“diminishes the victim’s independence and destroys her self-esteem so that she
feels she has no other option than to remain in the relationship.”23 Moreover,
teens “have a very real fear that the violence will intensify if they try to end the
relationship.”24 Such fears are well grounded, as teens face significant risk of
serious violence and homicide when attempting to end abusive relationships.25
Furthermore, teens often fail to disclose abuse. Recent studies indicate that
after experiencing violence in an abusive relationship, less than one in three
teens turned to a school counselor or social worker, or called an abuse

20. See Dating Violence, WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTER NEW RIVER VALLEY,
http://www.wrcnrv.org/helpingYou/ft_datingViolence.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2011)
(explaining that half of teens who witness domestic violence at home later experience abusive
relationships).
21. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 337 (noting that the expectations of peers contribute to
unhealthy teen dating behaviors).
22. Carole A. Sousa, Teen Dating Violence: The Hidden Epidemic, 37 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 356, 361 (1999) (footnote omitted).
23. See Kathryn E. Suarez, Comment, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for Expanded
Awareness and Legislation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 423, 430 (1994).
24. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 337 (citing Denise Glamache, Domination and Control:
The Social Context of Dating Violence, in DATING VIOLENCE: YOUNG WOMEN IN DANGER 81
(Barrie Levy ed., 1991)) (noting that serious violence or homicide most frequently occurs when
the teenager attempts to end the relationship).
25. See, e.g., JANICE ROEHL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
RISK ASSESSMENT VALIDATION STUDY, FINAL REPORT 4 (2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209731.pdf (finding that women attempting to separate from their
partners face an increased risk of both renewed violence and death); Nancy Glass et al., Young
Adult Intimate Partner Femicide, 12 HOMICIDE STUD. 177, 177–78 (2008) (finding that
adolescent and young adult women (ages sixteen to twenty) are more likely to be murdered by an
ex-partner than older adult women).
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helpline,26 and only seven percent of teens reported that they would talk to the
police.27 Teens are especially reticent to seek help from adults, including
parents.28 A study commissioned by Liz Claiborne, Inc. and the Family
Violence Prevention Fund found that only thirty-two percent of teens reported
talking to a parent after experiencing abuse.29 The study concluded that
parents are “dangerously out of touch” with the high level of teen dating
violence.30
Teens’ reticence to disclose abuse and seek help may stem from their desire
for independence and autonomy.31 Being perceived as in control of their lives
and being treated with the same respect accorded to adults are paramount goals
for many teens.32 Teens may fear that disclosures of abuse would cause adults,
especially parents, to doubt their ability to make good decisions, which could
result in a reduction of privileges.33 Teens also may be reluctant to disclose
abuse to their parents because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that their
families would disapprove of their relationships and punish them for having
entered the relationship to begin with.34 This may be a particularly pressing
26. TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 22 (reporting that only twenty-seven
percent of teens who experienced abuse turned to a school counselor or social worker, and only
twenty-five percent contacted an abuse helpline).
27. See Tiffany J. Zwicker, Note, Education Policy Brief: The Imperative of Developing
Teen Dating Violence Prevention and Intervention Programs in Secondary Schools, 12 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 131, 136 (2002).
28. See Hearing on Bill 17-55, The “Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007” Before the Comm.
on Pub. Safety & the Judiciary, 2007 Leg. 22–23 (D.C. 2007) [hereinafter Hearing on the
Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007] (statement of Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services
for WEAVE) (describing legal service providers’ experiences with teens who are unwilling to
seek help from parents because they fear their parents will disapprove of the relationship, or that
their reports of violence will not be believed); Brustin, supra note 16, at 332; Amy Karan & Lisa
Keating, Obsessive Teenage Love: The Precursor to Domestic Violence, 46 JUDGES’ J. 23, 24
(2007) (noting that teens are less likely than any group to report abuse and less than five percent
of teen crime victims tell a parent).
29. TEEN DATING ABUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 22.
30. Id. at 17 (reporting that sixty-three percent of parents whose children had experienced
dating violence incorrectly believed that violence was not a problem in the relationship).
31. See Leigh Goodmark & Catherine F. Klein, Deconstructing Teresa O’Brien: A Role
Play For Domestic Violence Clinics, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 260 (2004) (presenting a
role-playing exercise that exposes the real challenges faced by lawyers representing a teen who
minimizes the extent of abuse in her relationship and is hesitant to take action); Saperstein, supra
note 18, at 187 (explaining that teenagers rarely seek help from their families when experiencing
dating violence, “partly because the teenage years are typically characterized by rebellion and the
testing of limits where the child seeks to establish an identity separate from her family”).
32. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 428–29.
33. See Sousa, supra note 22, at 362; see also Cantalupo, supra note 14, at 53 (listing the
fear that family would find out as one of many reasons why ninety percent of young women who
were sexually assaulted did not report the abuse).
34. See Levesque, supra note 17, at 348–49 (citing Roger J.R. Levesque, The Peculiar
Place of Adolescents in the HIV-AIDS Epidemic: Unusual Progress & Usual Inadequacies in
Adolescent Jurisprudence”, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 237, 271 (1996)) (explaining that teenage
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fear for teens in same-sex relationships who have not disclosed their sexual
orientation to their families,35 or teens whose cultural or religious norms
prohibit intimacy between unmarried persons.36
Among some teens, the primacy of “toughness” in their communities may
further exacerbate the obstacles that already discourage them from seeking
help with abuse.37 For teens living in crime-ridden communities, violence may
be normalized.38 Teens who view violence as a normal part of life might not
recognize the violence in their relationships as being unhealthy and unsafe.39
These teens may also be more reluctant to disclose abuse for fear that they will
be perceived as weak and targeted by others for further violence.
Widely shared stereotypes about teens in our culture may exacerbate adult
impassiveness to teen dating violence. Teens often are perceived as
irresponsible, overdramatic, emotional, moody, self-centered, and destructive.
As a result, even when teens seek assistance from adults, they may be
disbelieved or disregarded.40
victims of dating violence are more unwilling to turn to a family member for help when engaged
in relationships prohibited by their families).
35. See id. at 352 (citing CLAIRE M. RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN
LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS 100–03 (1992)) (explaining that gay and lesbian teens experience
difficulty obtaining help after incidents of intimate-partner violence, as parents, schools, and
friends often ignore their requests); see also Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007,
supra note 28, at 22–23 (statement of Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services for
WEAVE) (explaining that gay and lesbian teens who are not “out” may be reluctant to seek help
from their parents).
36. See Barrie Levy, Introduction to DATING VIOLENCE: YOUNG WOMEN IN DANGER,
supra note 24, at 3, 6 (discussing how certain cultural backgrounds may keep young women from
turning to their families for help because the disclosure of intimate information can lead to
feelings of shame and helplessness).
37. See Donna E. Howard & Min Qi Wang, Risk Profiles of Adolescent Girls Who Were
Victims of Dating Violence, 38 ADOLESCENCE 6, 8 (2003) (describing findings that teen girls who
engaged in physical fights that resulted in medical treatment also experienced dating violence,
and girls who carried guns were five times more likely to experience violence in an adolescent
relationship).
38. See MICHAEL L. BENSON & GREER L. FOX, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC
DISTRESS, COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND INTIMATE VIOLENCE: AN APPLICATION AND EXTENSION
OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY, FINAL REPORT 10–12 (2002), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/193434.pdf (describing a National Institute of Justice
study, which concluded that contributing factors of high crime rates in communities, such as high
residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, weak social bonds between neighbors, normative
acceptance of violence, lack of resources for victims, and weaker law-enforcement control, are
also contributing factors to high rates of domestic violence in those communities); Jane Powers
& Erica Kerman, Teen Dating Violence, RESEARCH FACTS & FINDINGS, Feb. 2006, at 1, 3
(noting the correlation between community and dating violence).
39. Levesque, supra note 17, at 350 (citing Levy, supra note 36, at 12–13).
40. See id. at 349 (explaining that parents often do not take teen dating violence claims
seriously or minimize the experience); Sousa, supra note 22, at 363 (noting that when teenagers
report dating violence, “‘[a]dults may assume that they . . . are overreacting, acting out, or going
through a phase’” (quoting Levy, supra note 36, at 5)).
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In sum, women are most likely to experience intimate-partner abuse during
their adolescent and young-adult years;41 the experience of dating violence can
have a devastating and lasting impact on teens;42 teen victims are likely to seek
assistance only when abuse has reached a crisis point;43 and teens who seek
help with abuse are likely to be disbelieved or not taken seriously.44 The many
factors that conspire to put teens at significant risk of abuse and inhibit teens
from disclosing abuse make it critical that protection orders are readily
accessible to teens. If courts turn teens away when they seek legal protection,
a second opportunity for intervention may never materialize.
II. THE CIVIL PROTECTION-ORDER REMEDY AND ITS BENEFITS FOR TEENS
Until the 1970s, domestic violence was not widely recognized as a social
problem.45 After the women’s movement brought attention to the issue, an
expansive array of legal protections and social services developed to assist
women subjected to abuse in the United States.46 One of the most significant
41. See RENNISON, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting that intimate-partner violence occurs at
higher rates among young women as compared to older women).
42. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43. See Christine N. Carlson, Invisible Victims: Holding the Educational System Liable for
Teen Dating Violence, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 351, 366 (2003) (suggesting that teens will not
seek help unless the situation is dire).
44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 16, 29–30 (1982) (describing the relationship between
the women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the emergence of awareness of domestic
abuse, and noting that “in 1970, there were supposedly few abused women” and that “[a]s late as
1974, the term ‘battered woman’ was not part of the vocabulary”); Joan S. Meier, Domestic
Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and
Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. OF GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 668 (2003) (stating that
even in the 1980s, “women were often hounded out of court and overly disdained for claiming
domestic violence, even in protection order cases”); Schneider, supra note 5, at 354 (“It was not
until the late 1960s or early 1970s that the issue of domestic violence surfaced in U.S. law.”).
46. See LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 35–37 (2008)
(describing the early efforts of activists to provide advocacy and resources for women who have
experienced abuse since the women’s movement brought the problem to public attention in the
1970s); Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
Exploration of Women’s International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 104 (2003)
(providing an overview of the 1970s and 1980s movement against the subordination of women
and challenging gendered laws); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HAW. L. REV. 1849, 1868 (1996) (crediting
the feminist movement with raising awareness of domestic violence); Catherine F. Klein
& Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993) (noting how significant legal
reform efforts directed at ending domestic violence were created in response to the women’s
movement in the 1960s and 1970s); Marcy L. Karin & Paula Shapiro, Domestic Violence at
Work: Legal and Business Perspectives, SLOAN WORK & FAM. RES. NETWORK (Apr. 2009),
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/ encyclopedia_entry.php?id= 15512&area=All (highlighting the effect of
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and widely adopted legal remedies to address domestic violence is the civil
protection order, which is currently available in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia.47 Protection orders typically offer a wide range of remedies
aimed at ensuring a petitioner’s safety, supporting her autonomy, and
preventing future abuse,48 including stay-away and no-contact orders, orders to
vacate a joint residence, temporary-custody and child-support awards,
mandated batterer’s treatment or substance abuse counseling, and financial
assistance.49 An individual may obtain a protection order if she has
experienced or been threatened with certain types of abuse, and if she has a
particular relationship to the perpetrator.50
In the 1990s, scholars, researchers, and advocates began to note the
prevalence of abuse in adolescent relationships. In seminal works published at
that time, legal scholars Stacy Brustin and Roger Levesque analyzed the ways
in which legal remedies and social services developed for adult victims of
abuse excluded teen victims.51 Levesque argued that our “adult-centered legal
system essentially fails to recognize the victimization of adolescents by
devoting all of its resources to adult victims.”52 Levesque posited that “[i]n the
area of relationship violence—what for adults is labeled domestic
violence—this failure to recognize adolescent issues has resulted in the legal
federal laws, including The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), as well as state laws
designed to protect victims).
47. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 46, at 79; Laurie S. Kohn, What’s so Funny About
Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence
Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2010).
48. See, e.g., Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Md. 2001)
(noting that Maryland’s domestic-violence protection orders are “designed to separate the parties
and avoid future abuse” (citing Barbee v. Barbee, 537 A.2d 224, 225 (Md. 1988))); Frisk v. Frisk,
719 N.W.2d 332, 335 (N.D. 2006) (stating that the purpose of North Dakota’s protection-order
statute “is to protect victims of domestic violence from further harm” (citing Gaab v. Ochshner,
636 N.W.2d 669, 671 (N.D. 2001))); Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007) (stating that the purpose of Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act “is to protect victims
of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse with the primary goal of advance
prevention of physical and sexual abuse” (citing Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2006))); see also Robin R. Runge, Employment Rights of Sexual Assault Victims, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 299, 308 (2006) (exploring the gradual development of workplace
protection orders to improve women’s safety).
49. See Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2009); Klein & Orloff, supra note
46, at 910–1015 (addressing the various remedies that courts may order in protection-order
cases).
50. Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 814–42, 848; Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives
and Unequal Protection Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 102
(2005) (noting that to obtain a civil protection order, “a victim must show both that she shares a
particular type of relationship with her abuser and that she suffered a particular variety of abuse at
his hands”).
51. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 339; Levesque, supra note 17, at 356–57 (emphasizing the
legal barriers that prevent teen abuse victims from accessing support).
52. Levesque, supra note 17, at 342.
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system, either formally or in practice, actually excluding adolescent victims.”53
Similarly, Brustin noted that “[t]he majority of civil protection order statutes
and criminal statutes are not designed with teen dating violence in mind,” and
that “criminal justice system training and special support services do not focus
on the problem of [teen dating violence].”54 Brustin further highlighted
specific civil- and criminal-law failings regarding teens subjected to abuse,
including the failure of protection-order statutes to encompass dating
relationships and grant teens the legal capacity to proceed independently in
court proceedings.55 Brustin also noted the failure to treat intimate partner
violence as something other than a routine offense in juvenile proceedings,56
and the need to impose conditions of release and disposition terms to protect
the victim, such as mandating stay-away orders and counseling.57 Both Brustin
and Leveque argued for “the need to develop comprehensive policies that will
both protect vulnerable youth from abusive relationships and aim to change
socio-legal structures that create and sustain tolerance for youth’s
victimization.”58 They also advocated expanding the protection-order remedy
to encompass dating relationships59 and permitting minors to seek relief on
their own,60 or at least clarifying when minors are entitled to do so.61
In the 1990s and 2000s, many states launched advocacy campaigns to create
protections for abused teens with some important successes, including the
expansion of protection-order statutes in many jurisdictions to encompass
dating relationships.62 A few states explicitly grant teens access to the
protection-order remedy.63 Despite these advances, Brustin’s and Levesque’s
critiques largely ring true today; the protection-order remedy remains a
resource created for adults and often excludes teen victims.
It is critical that teens have ready access to the protection-order remedy, as it
is the only legal remedy today that provides expedited, comprehensive, and
53. Id. at 343.
54. Brustin, supra note 16, at 339.
55. Id. at 339.
56. Id. at 342.
57. Id. at 344.
58. Levesque, supra note 17, at 344; see also Brustin, supra note 16, at 351 (contending that
criminal-justice actors need to be adequately trained to respond to abuse).
59. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 350; Levesque, supra note 17, at 368.
60. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 350; Levesque, supra note 17, at 368 (proposing that
minors be given explicit authority to bring suit on their own behalf).
61. Brustin, supra note 16, at 351.
62. Compare Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 835 (noting that as of 1993 only twelve
states extended the protection-order remedy to parties in dating relationships), with Devon M.
Largio, Note, Refining the Meaning and Application of “Dating Relationship” Language in
Domestic Violence Statutes, 60 VAND. L. REV. 939, 958–59 (2007) (reporting that as of 2007,
thirty-six states and the District of Columbia had extended the protection-order remedy to parties
in dating relationships).
63. See infra Part III.A.1.
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empowering relief. Civil protection orders provide “an important tool for
protecting victims of domestic violence.”64 Protection-order proceedings are
designed to provide expedited relief, which can help protect individuals who
are attempting to leave abusive relationships and thus are at great risk of
violence.65 Protection orders also “offer options for relief that are often more
comprehensive than those available in criminal and other non-domestic
violence orders,”66 which enable petitioners to sever ties that might otherwise
keep them in abusive relationships. In particular, protection orders often
authorize courts to enter temporary custody, visitation, financial and
child-support awards, order perpetrators to complete counseling programs and
to grant “any [other] constitutionally defensible relief.”67 The flexibility courts
possess in crafting protection orders enables petitioners to obtain relief tailored
the circumstances of their particular relationships.68 Protection orders also
carry the threat of criminal prosecution to encourage compliance. Finally, as
“the most survivor-centered remedy readily available in courthouses across
America,”69 protection orders are critical for their “ability to shift power and
control back to the person who has experienced violence.”70 By offering
petitioners a choice of remedies and tools for enforcement, protection orders
empower victims to take control of their cases and their lives.71 Civil
protection orders benefit teens who have experienced abuse for the same
reasons as they do adults.
III. MINORS’ ABILITY TO ACCESS PROTECTION ORDERS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA AND THE FIFTY STATES
States have created the status of minority to protect the interests of children.
Legislatures in every state have designated the legal age of majority, the age at
which individuals enjoy full control over their own affairs and full legal rights,

64. Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 811.
65. See Marina Angel, Abusive Boys Kill Girls Just Like Abusive Men Kill Women:
Explaining the Obvious, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 283, 295 (1999) (“Only recently has it
been recognized that a woman’s attempt to leave an abusive relationship is dangerous and can
turn deadly.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 63 (1991) (pointing out the danger women face when separating
from an abuser).
66. Smith, supra note 50, at 100; see also Brustin, supra note 16, at 338 (noting that civil
restraining orders, which may be “cumbersome and costly,” typically offer fewer remedies than
civil protection orders).
67. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 911, 944–45 (encouraging courts to interpret their
statutory mandate broadly to create appropriate remedies).
68. Id.
69. Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize
the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 307 (2011).
70. Id.
71. Smith, supra note 50, at 120.
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which typically occurs at age eighteen.72 Minors—individuals who have not
reached the age of legal majority—have limited rights and limited ability to
control their legal affairs.73 The American legal system’s treatment of minors
differs from its treatment of adults in many respects.74 The differential
treatment of minors is justified by “their age, their lack of maturity, their
occasional helplessness, and their paucity of experience with life, as well as
their reliance—or their former reliance—on their families to protect them.”75
State legislatures have the power to determine the ages at which minors
assume various rights and duties, which vary by jurisdiction.76 States regulate
minors’ ability to access justice in the protection-order context in three primary
ways: defining minors’ rights to standing,77 defining minors’ rights to legal
capacity,78 and mandating parental notification of minors’ claims.79
A. Standing: Teens’ Rights to Obtain Legal Protection from Abuse
The accessibility of civil protection orders to teens depends, first, on whether
a jurisdiction accords them standing. Standing is a component of a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case80 and encompasses “a party’s right to
make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”81 Although
the precise elements of standing vary by jurisdiction, the standard inquiry
generally depends on whether a party “suffered injury in fact to a legally
protected interest as contemplated by statutory law or constitutional
72. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (9th ed. 2009); see also NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE
LAWS 564–74 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 6th ed. 2008) (compiling state statutes regarding
emancipation and ages of majority).
73. See Abraham Kuhl, Comment, Post-Majority Educational Support for Children in the
Twenty-First Century, 21 J. AM. MATRIMONIAL L. 763, 769 (2008) (“‘When the child reaches
[the age of majority,] the child no longer suffers from the disabilities that previously mandated
court protection, such as the inability to manage affairs or enjoy civic rights.’” (quoting Charles
F. Wilson, But Daddy Why Can’t I Go to College? The Frightening De-kline of Support for
Children’s Post-Secondary Education, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1996))).
74. DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 1:1, at 6 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).
75. Id.
76. See id. § 6 (citing Valley Nat’l Bank v. Glover, 159 P.2d 292 (Ariz. 1945); Jacobsen v.
Lenhart, 195 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. 1964); Zelnick v. Adams, 606 S.E.2d 843 (Va. 2005)) (indicating
the legislature’s authority to establish the age of majority).
77. See infra Part III.A.
78. See infra Part III.B.
79. See infra Part III.C.
80. See, e.g., State v. 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999) (“When a
party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (citing Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d
618, 626 (Tex. 1996))); Tomlinson v. Bd. of Educ. of Bristol, 629 A.2d 333, 341 (Conn. 1993)
(providing that “[i]f a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter
jurisdiction to determine the cause” (citing Hous. Auth. v. Local 1161, 468 A.2d 1251, 1253
(Conn. App. Ct. 1984))).
81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 1536.
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provisions.”82 To bring any claim for relief in civil proceedings, all
parties—regardless of age—must demonstrate that the law provides them with
standing, “the legal right to set the judicial machinery in motion.”83
Although the concepts are often confused or conflated, a minor’s standing to
assert a legal claim is a separate determination from whether the minor has the
legal capacity to pursue the claim on his or her own behalf in court.84 Legal
capacity entails a party’s “satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal age
or soundness of mind, [which] determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.”85
Essentially, standing determines a party’s right to seek legal relief, whereas
capacity determines how a party must pursue his or her claims for relief in
court.86
State protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups with regard to
standing for minor petitioners: (1) statutes that expressly grant standing to

82. Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 1977); see also Mass. Ass’n of Indep.
Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 367 N.E.2d 796, 799 (Mass. 1977) (stating that
“[a] party has standing when it can allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or
regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred” (citing Westland Hous. Corp.
v. Comm’r of Ins., 225 N.E.2d 782, 788–89 (Mass. 1967); Mass. Soc’y of Optometrists v.
Waddick, 165 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Mass. 1960); Circle Lounge & Grill, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeal of
Bos., 86 N.E.2d 920, 922–25 (Mass. 1949))); R.I. Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d
124, 129 (R.I. 1974) (“The question is whether the person whose standing is challenged has
alleged an injury in fact resulting from the challenged statute. If he has, he satisfies the
requirement of standing.”).
83. Hiland v. Ives, 257 A.2d 822, 823 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966).
84. See, e.g., McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaronek, 370 F.3d 275,
284 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that in a case brought by parents on behalf of their minor children,
the court must determine whether the minor children—not their parents—had standing to pursue
the claim); Pintek v. Superior Court, 277 P.2d 265, 268 (Ariz. 1954) (“[A]n infant generally may
sue or be sued, and is subject to and bound by the same rules of procedure as an adult litigant, yet
an infant cannot bring or defend a legal proceeding in person, but must sue or be sued by a legally
appointed general guardian, or next friend or a guardian ad litem.”); Hudis v. Crawford, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 50, 54 (Ct. App. 2005) (“‘There is a difference between capacity to sue, which is the
right to come into court, and [standing to bring] a cause of action, which is the right to relief in
court. Incapacity to sue exists when there is some legal disability, such as infancy . . . .’” (quoting
Klopstock v. Superior Court of S.F., 108 P.2d 13, 18 (Cal. 1941) (alteration in original))); Cmty.
Bd. 7 of Manhattan v. Schaffer, 639 N.E.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. 1994) (“[T]he concept of capacity is often
confused with the concept of standing, but the two legal doctrines are not interchangeable.”);
Nootsie, Ltd. v. William Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996) (“A plaintiff has
standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a
party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable
interest in the controversy.” (citing Pledger v. Schoellkopf, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1988);
Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984))).
85. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 235.
86. See Schaffer, 639 N.E.2d at 3–4 (noting that standing relates to whether a party has
“cognizable stake in the outcome,” whereas capacity relates to “power to appear and bring its
grievance before the court”).
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some or all minors;87 (2) statutes that expressly deny standing to some or all
minors;88 and (3) statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.89
1. Statutes According Standing to Minors
Following widespread advocacy efforts to expand protections for teen
victims, protection-order statutes in many states now expressly confer standing
on minors.90 These statutes range in coverage. Some confer blanket grants of
standing,91 whereas others selectively permit standing depending upon
enumerated factors, such as the minor’s relationship with the respondent, the
minor’s age, and the respondent’s age.92
Today, four states and the District of Columbia explicitly grant standing to
minor victims of any age, which is coextensive with the standing granted to
adults.93 In these states, minors can seek protection orders against persons
with whom they share any qualifying relationship.94 Illinois, for example,
decrees that a “[p]etitioner shall not be denied an order of protection because
petitioner or respondent is a minor.”95 Missouri takes a more limited approach,
granting standing only to minors seventeen and older, but permitting
seventeen-year-olds to seek protection orders against individuals with whom
they share any qualifying relationship.
Several other states selectively extend standing to minors of any age who
share particular relationships with their abusers or who are victims of particular
crimes.96 For example, New Hampshire provides that “[t]he minority of the
plaintiff shall not preclude the court from issuing protective orders against a

87. See infra Part III.A.1.
88. See infra Part III.A.2.
89. See infra Part III.A.3.
90. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3), (5) (2010) (defining domestic violence as an
offense by or against a “household member” and including minors within the definition of
“household member”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (permitting the
issuance of protective orders to minors).
91. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 97–111 and accompanying text.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3), (5); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 372(b)(1)(c) (West 2004
& Supp. 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a); D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(1)–(5) (Supp. 2011); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/214(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 60.1.1, 60.1.4, 60.2A (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). Tennessee explicitly grants minors standing
to seek protection orders based on the same qualifying relationships available to adults, but does
not specify whether minors have standing to seek protection orders against sexual assailants or
stalkers. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
94. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3), (5); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1)(c); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6301(a); D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(1)–(5); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/214(a); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60.1.1, 60.1.4, 60.2.
95. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/214(a).
96. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(2)(a)–(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5).
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present or former intimate partner, spouse, or ex-spouse.”97 States have
granted minors standing to seek protection from dating partners,98 spouses,99
co-parents,100 sexual partners,101 parents,102 custodians,103 relatives,104
cohabitants,105 parents’ intimate partners,106 stalkers,107 and those who have
engaged in repeated violence against them.108
Other states extend even more limited grants of standing depending on the
ages of the parties and the nature of their relationship.109 For example,
97. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II)(a).
98. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(1), (2)(F) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2011
Reg. Sess. and June Sp. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(1)(d)(1),
(2)(b); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(1) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II)(a); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1(2) (2003 & Supp.
2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5)(c); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess. and First Called Sess. of 82nd Legislature) (effective Sept. 1, 2011); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2) (West 2005
& Supp. 2011) (granting standing to minors ages sixteen and older for protection from dating
partners).
99. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II)(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5)(A).
100. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d).
101. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5)(c).
102. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.010(2).
103. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(3) (1997 & Supp. 2010).
104. See, e.g., id. § 15-15-1(2), (4) (2003 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-601(5)(D); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(1), (2).
105. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5)(B).
106. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5)(F).
107. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a)–(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
108. See, e.g., id. § 784.046(1)(b) (defining “[r]epeat violence” as “two incidents of violence
or stalking committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the
filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family
member”). The statute defines “violence” to include “any assault, aggravated assault, battery,
aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or
false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, by a person
against any other person.” Id. § 784.046(1)(a).
109. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2011
Reg. Sess. and June Sp. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2011) (granting standing to minors sixteen and
older abused by non-relative cohabitants with whom they are not in a dating relationship); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (granting standing to minor victims of certain
offenses committed by adult family or household members); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.726
(West 2003) (granting standing to minor spouses and minors in sexually intimate relationships if
the respondent is eighteen years of age or older); see also UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-7-102-103
(LexisNexis 2008) (granting minors ages sixteen and older standing to seek protection orders
against current or former spouses, persons with whom they are or were living as a spouse,
relatives by blood or marriage, co-parents, the other parent of an unborn child, and current or
former cohabitants); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(1)(b) (Supp. 2011) (according minors
thirteen and older standing to seek protection orders against dating partners aged sixteen and
older); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a) (2001) (defining “adult” to include any person who is
either at least sixteen years old or legally married). The Wyoming statute, however, also grants
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Washington grants minors age thirteen and older the right to seek protection
orders against dating partners age sixteen and older,110 whereas Connecticut
grants minors age sixteen and older the right to seek protection orders against
non-relative cohabitants, but grants standing to people of any age against
dating partners.111
2. Statutes Denying Standing to Minors
Just as states are empowered to confer standing to seek protection orders for
minor petitioners, states also may deny standing to minors.112 Wisconsin is the
only state that entirely denies minors standing to seek domestic-violence
protection orders.113 As described above, several states restrict minors’
standing by age or relationship to the respondent. Missouri denies standing to
minors under the age of seventeen.114 Additionally, several states deny minors
standing to seek relief against parents,115 household members,116 relatives,117 or
minors in their households.118 Appellate courts are often called upon to
enforce these restrictions.119 New Jersey courts have repeatedly vacated

standing to “persons,” a potentially broader term than “adult,” in certain qualifying relationships.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102. The statute does not explicitly define “person,” making it
unclear whether minors in those specific qualifying relationships were intended to have standing
even if younger than sixteen or not legally married. See id.
110. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(1)(b). But cf. id. § 26.50.020(2) (limiting standing
to seek protection orders against dating partners to minors age sixteen and older). This
discrepancy appears to be a drafting error.
111. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a.
112. See infra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
113. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(1)(am) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (defining “domestic
abuse” as only being perpetrated by and against “adult[s]”).
114. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(2), (7) (West Supp. 2011).
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(4) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(27) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(X)(b)
(LexisNexis 2010) (denying standing if the minor lives with the defendant parent).
116. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.705 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1), (3) (1997 & Supp.
2010).
117. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(2)(C)–(D) (West, Westlaw through Jan.
2011 Reg. Sess. and June Sp. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:1(X); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 107.705(3)(c), 107.726.
118. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(1), (4) (1998 & Supp. 2010)
(providing that minors are only considered household members if the defendant is an adult).
119. P.M. ex rel. D.H. v. R.H., No. 03-2059, 2004 WL 1899919, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
26, 2004) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a protection order on behalf of a
minor child against a parent); Seufert v. Seufert, 693 A.2d 86, 87 (N.H. 1997) (reversing entry of
protection order against a parent on behalf of minor child because the protection-order statute
excluded minor children living with a defendant from the protected class); Strother v. Strother, 34
P.3d 736, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (overturning a protection order sought by a mother on behalf
of her minor child against the child’s father because the statute did not offer minors protection
against parents).

474

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:457

protection orders entered to protect minors against household members
because New Jersey law deprives minors of standing to pursue such claims.120
3. Ambiguous or Silent Statutes
Protection-order statutes in several other jurisdictions do not explicitly
address the extent to which minors are accorded standing, or the statutes
address the issue only partially. For example, although several statutes
explicitly grant standing to the minor children of adult parties in qualifying
relationships, they do not specify whether such minors have standing to seek
protection orders in their own qualifying relationships, such as with dating
partners or cohabitants.121 Other statutes include children, stepchildren, or
foster children in the list of qualifying relationships, but do not state whether
minor children have standing under these categories, or under any other listed
categories.122 Still other statutes address whether minors have standing to seek
protection within some relationships, but remain silent regarding others.123
120. See M.D. v. T.H., No. FV-07-003209-06, 2007 WL 2580567, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 10, 2007) (striking down a restraining order issued to protect a minor from abuse
by a cousin and former household member for lack of standing); M.A. v. E.A., 909 A.2d 1168,
1169, 1172–73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding that the protection-order statute’s
exclusion of minor victims abused by household members also precluded a mother from seeking
a protection order on behalf of her minor child against the child’s stepfather).
121. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2)(a) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-244.8(b) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(1), (4); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(a)
(2009 & Supp. 2010).
122. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15103(4) (2009 & Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.720(2) (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(4) (2010 & Supp. 2011); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(l)(4) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(b)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-903(1), (3) (LexisNexis
2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D) (2005 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)
(McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (2009 & Supp. 2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(3)(a)(ii)–(iii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2011); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.003, 71.004(1),
71.006 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2010 & Supp. 2011); cf.
Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 576 (W. Va. 2006) (interpreting a statute listing
children and stepchildren as qualifying relationships to extend protections to minors).
123. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting minors to seek
protection against adult family or household members who committed certain acts against them,
but failing to clarify whether minors can seek protection against minor family or household
members); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1(X), 173-B:3(II)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting
minors to seek protection orders against spouses and intimate partners, and prohibiting minors
from seeking orders against parents and relatives with whom they reside, but not addressing
whether minors can seek orders against non-relative cohabitants); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3601(5) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (explicitly conferring standing on minors in numerous subcategories
as “domestic abuse victims,” but does not address whether minors have standing to seek
protection orders against stalkers and sexual assailants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2010)
(permitting minors to file against dating partners, but does not address other qualifying
relationships); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2011) (defining “adult” to include minors sixteen
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Finally, some statutes remain entirely silent on whether minors have standing
to seek protection orders in the jurisdiction.124
A final group of statutes, sometimes without explicitly addressing whether
minors are granted standing, accords standing to particular adults to seek
protection orders on behalf of minors.125 Adults with standing to seek
protection orders on behalf of minors include parents, guardians, and
custodians,126 adults appointed by the court,127 district attorneys,128 domestic
violence program or shelter staff and volunteers,129 family members,130

and older, and granting standing to “adult children” and “adults sharing common living quarters,”
but not defining “person,” and thus leaving ambiguous whether minors of any age can seek
protection in other qualifying relationships such as marriage, dating, or cohabiting).
124. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 2007) (failing to provide a
definition for who “persons” are for purposes of defining household matters); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-10-1(2) (2004 & Supp. 2011); cf. Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 869–70
(S.D. 1997) (holding that South Dakota’s protection-order statute, though silent on the issue,
accords standing to minor victims).
125. ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-2(2), 30-5-5 (LexisNexis 1989 & Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.66.100(a) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602A (2010); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-14-103(c) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1041(3)(a)–(b), 1043(a) (1999 & Supp. 2010);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(2)(a)–(c) (2007 & Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2010);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(b)(1)–(2)
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104(b) (2005 & Supp. 2009); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(3) (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(c) (2010
& Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4005(1) (1998 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(m)(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(a); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-7(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(3) (2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(C); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(a) (1985 & Supp. 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(c) (West 2008
& Supp. 2010).
126. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(A); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 1041(3), 1043(a); D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(1) (Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-26-5-2(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3(1) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3104(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(c); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7(1); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-15-102(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(C); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a) (2010). The Vermont Supreme Court interpreted its statute to
confer standing only to parents to seek protection orders on behalf of minors. See Wood ex rel.
Eddy v. Eddy, 833 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Vt. 2003) (agreeing that a mother had standing to seek a
protection order on behalf of her minor daughter); Bigelow v. Bigelow, 721 A.2d 98, 100 (Vt.
1998) (holding that the statute “does not encompass petitions by third parties, even grandparents,
on behalf of minor children”).
127. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a).
128. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(c); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-501(m)(2)(ii)(1).
129. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(4) (2009).
130. Id. § 9-15-201(d)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.725(3); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(m)(2)(ii)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.2(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(1)(a) (Supp. 2010);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-305(2) (2009).
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guardians ad litem,131 household members,132 “persons responsible for” a
minor,133 state agencies,134 and any other adults.135
4. Emancipated Minors
A common misperception is that emancipated minors enjoy the same rights
to standing as adults in civil legal proceedings. Emancipation entails either the
termination of a parent’s rights and obligations to a child,136 the “removal of
the disabilities of minority,”137 or some combination thereof. In some states,
children are emancipated automatically upon marriage or enlistment in the
military.138 Emancipation may also be accomplished by a court order in two
ways. First, a parent may bring an action for judicial emancipation, requesting
to be relieved of rights and duties regarding a child.139 Second, a child may
bring an action for statutory emancipation, which would remove the disabilities
of minority and confer the legal rights of adulthood.140 Judicial emancipation
is often entered for specific purposes and may not alter a minor’s legal rights

131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(3); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a).
132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(1); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3104(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(c); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-501(m)(2)(ii)(4); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(C) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(A);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(a) (1985 & Supp. 2010); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(1); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-305(2).
133. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4005(1) (1998 & Supp. 2010).
134. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-103(1)(c) (2011) (“local law enforcement agenc[ies]”
and “county department of social services”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(3)(b) (1990 & Supp.
2010) (“Division of Child Protective Services”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(2) (“any
state agency”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(m)(2)(ii)(2) (“department of social
services”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4005(1) (department of child and family services);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(d)(2) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) (“Department of Family and
Protective Services”).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-103(1)(c) (“a responsible person”); D.C. CODE
§ 16-1003(a)(1) (Supp. 2011) (“other appropriate adult”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2010)
(“a person who is not a minor”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(b) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2010) (“another representative”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (“a
reputable adult age 25 or older” if in the best interest of the child); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.002(c) (“any adult” may file).
136. Sanford N. Katz et al., Emancipating Our Children—Coming of Legal Age in America,
7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 214 (1973).
137. Id. at 232.
138. See, e.g., Alice M. Wright, Annotation, What Voluntary Acts of Child, Other Than
Marriage or Entry into Military Service, Terminate Parent’s Obligation to Support, 55 A.L.R.
557, 572 (1998) (observing that in addition to attaching the legal age of majority, entry into the
military and marriage are recognized as ways for minors to gain emancipation).
139. William E. Dean, Note, Ireland v. Ireland: Judicial Emancipation of Minors in Idaho:
Protecting the Best Interests of the Child or Conferring a Windfall upon the Parent?, 31 IDAHO
L. REV. 205, 215 (1994).
140. Id. at 216.
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and duties outside of the parent-child relationship.141 By contrast, statutory
emancipation often “achieves a more comprehensive promotion into
adulthood.”142 Statutory emancipation may be complete, or the court may only
grant the minor partial rights, limited either in scope or duration.143 In a
majority of states, the procedures and grounds for emancipation are statutorily
defined.144 In the remaining states, common law governs whether a child is
emancipated.145
Emancipation alone does not automatically confer to minors all the legal
rights and protections accorded to adults.146 Consequently, emancipated
minors may not be viewed as adults for standing purposes. Protection-order
statutes in several states, however, explicitly confer standing on emancipated
minors as “adults,” 147 allowing them to seek protection orders under statutes
otherwise applicable only to adults.

141. Id. at 217; see also Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating
Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 245 (1992).
142. Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 141, at 245.
143. See Katz et al., supra note 136, at 215 (indicating the variations in rights accorded
through judicial emancipation).
144. See PATRICIA JULIANELLE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, ALONE
WITHOUT A HOME: A STATE BY STATE REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING UNACCOMPANIED YOUTH
63 (1st ed. 2003) (compiling state statutes regarding emancipation and commending the majority
of states for establishing legal processes for emancipation).
145. See Leiter, supra note 72, at 564, 571 (highlighting states that rely on the common law
for emancipation determinations, such as Colorado and Rhode Island).
146. See Wickham v. Torley, 71 S.E. 881, 882 (Ga. 1911) (“[E]ven emancipation of the
minor from parental control . . . does not remove his disability and clothe him with the power to
contract.”); Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 89 N.E. 796, 797 (Ill. 1909) (“[T]he contract of an
infant is, in general, voidable by him, and gains no additional force from the fact that he is
engaged in business for himself or is emancipated.”); Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 719
(Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (finding no authority for the proposition that “solely because of
emancipation, the infant is sui juris for all purposes”). Several courts, for example, have rejected
defenses to charges of soliciting minors for obscene performances based on the involved minors’
emancipated status, holding that because the statutes in question made no exception for
emancipated minors, they were intended to protect all persons under the age of majority. See
State v. Robinette, 652 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ladmer, 775 S.W.2d
6, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also
Katz et al., supra note 136, at 229, 237 (noting that courts have construed judicial emancipations
as only terminating parental rights and not as conferring benefits of adulthood).
147. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(2) (LexisNexis 1989 & Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 4002(2) (1998 & Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3(b) (West 2007 & Supp.
2010) (emancipation by marriage); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a), (d), (e) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.1(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1), (3) (1997 & Supp. 2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(2) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
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B. Legal Capacity: Teens’ Rights to Represent Their Own Interests in
Protection-Order Proceedings
The accessibility of protection orders for teens depends not only on whether
minors have standing to sue, but also on whether they have the legal capacity
to represent their own interests in the litigation. Capacity entails a party’s
“satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal age or soundness of mind,
that determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.”148 Generally, minors do not
have capacity to take civil legal action.149 Instead, minors often must advance
civil claims through an adult representative.150 Typically, a parent or guardian
on the minor’s behalf initiates cases involving the legal claims of a minor.151
In the event that a parent or guardian is unavailable or a minor does not want
her parent or guardian involved in the case, a court must determine whether it
is appropriate to appoint another adult representative to protect the minor’s
interests in the litigation and who such a representative should be.152 In these
circumstances, a next friend, guardian ad litem, or attorney is appointed.153
Protection-order statutes are mostly ambiguous as to whether teens have
capacity to seek protection orders on their own. Most statutes fail to address
the legal capacity of minors to pursue claims for protection orders. Even
statutes that clearly grant standing to teens often say nothing about the
procedures to be employed in cases involving teen parties.154 Furthermore,
imprecise legislative drafting makes it difficult to distinguish teens’ rights to
standing from their capacity to pursue claims. For example, Oregon’s
protection-order statute includes a provision titled “Standing to petition for
relief,” which provides that “[a] person who is under 18 years of age may
148. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 235.
149. 2 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 11:13
(2011) (indicating that unemancipated minors generally do not have capacity to sue); 4 JAMES
WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.21[3][a], at 17-96-97 & n.16 (3d ed. 2011);
Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L.
REV. 869, 878 (2007) (providing a historical overview of children’s legal rights).
150. 4 MOORE, supra note 149, § 17.21[3][a], at 17-96-97; 2 JACOBS, supra note 149,
§ 11:31.
151. See 1 KRAMER, supra note 74, § 12:3, at 876 (noting that parents often represent a child
in legal proceedings, unless “it appears that the minor’s general representative has interests which
may conflict with those of the person he is supposed to represent” (quoting Hoffert v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981))); 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 9:25, at 253–54 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that guardians must bring cases on behalf of
minors).
152. See 1 KRAMER, supra note 74, § 12:4, at 879 (highlighting the court’s discretion in
appointing representatives to represent minors); 4 MOORE, supra note 149, § 17.21[3][a], at
17-93-94 (noting the court’s role of protecting the minor’s interests); 6A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1570, at 665–66 (3d ed. 2010).
153. See 1 KRAMER, supra note 74, § 12:4, at 879; 5 LORD, supra note 151, § 9.25, at
253–54; 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 75 (2009).
154. See infra Part III.B.3.
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petition the circuit court for relief” if the person is a current or former spouse
or a sexually intimate partner of the respondent.155 Although its title refers
only to “standing,” the provision appears to address both standing and capacity
by articulating the circumstances under which minors have a claim to
protection orders and by permitting qualifying minors to petition the court for
relief on their own.156
Although the widespread ambiguity of state protection-order statutes
regarding minors’ capacity makes them difficult to categorize, state
protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups, with somewhat blurred
distinctions: (1) statutes that expressly grant legal capacity to some or all minor
petitioners;157 (2) statutes that expressly deny legal capacity to some or all
minor petitioners;158 and (3) statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the
issue.159
1. Statutes Explicitly Granting Legal Capacity to Minor Petitioners
Reform efforts to increase protections for abused teens have resulted in
protection-order statutes in several U.S. jurisdictions that explicitly accord at
least some minors the legal capacity to seek protection orders under certain
circumstances. Depending on factors such as the minor-petitioner’s age and
the relationship between the minor petitioner and the respondent, these statutes
accord minor petitioners the capacity to proceed autonomously in
protection-order litigation to varying extents.160 Most statutes extending legal
capacity to minors do so according to objective standards, which grant capacity
along bright lines to all minors meeting certain requirements.161 At least two
jurisdictions incorporate a subjective standard that requires courts to assess
whether to grant capacity according to each minor’s individual
circumstances.162
a. Objective Extensions of Legal Capacity
Several states grant minors some measure of legal capacity to pursue claims
for protection orders based on objective criteria. On the most explicit end of
the spectrum, two states and the District of Columbia expressly grant certain

155. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.726 (West 2003).
156. See id.
157. See infra Part III.B.1.
158. See infra Part III.B.2.
159. See infra Part III.B.3.
160. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(2)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011)
(delineating sixteen as the age at which a minor may pursue action without a guardian).
161. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
162. See infra Part III.B.1.b (noting that two jurisdictions have subjective criteria).
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teens the legal capacity to file petitions on their own and represent themselves
in court, based on their ages and relationships with the respondent.163
California permits minors twelve and older to file protection orders on their
own against respondents with whom they share any qualifying relationship,164
and states that in such cases, minors “may appear in court without a guardian,
counsel, or guardian ad litem.”165 California provides the court with guidance
on appropriate measures for protecting unrepresented minors’ interests, stating:
The court may, either upon motion or in its own discretion, and after
considering reasonable objections by the minor to the appointment of
specific individuals, appoint a guardian ad litem to assist the minor in
obtaining or opposing the order, provided that the appointment of
the guardian ad litem does not delay the issuance or denial of the
order being sought. In making the determination concerning the
appointment of a particular guardian ad litem, the court shall
consider whether the minor and the guardian have divergent
interests.166
Similarly, the District of Columbia permits minors sixteen and older to file
petitions for protection orders on their own against abusers in any qualifying
relationship, and minors twelve to fifteen years of age to file protection orders
autonomously against romantic, sexual, or dating partners.167 The D.C. Code
further provides that where a minor petitioner twelve and older appears in
court without an adult representative, the court may appoint an attorney to
represent the minor “if doing so will not unduly delay the issuance or denial of
a protection order.”168 Similarly, Washington’s statute provides that persons

163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1)(C)–(D) (West 2004) (according minors age
twelve and older the legal capacity to appear in court without an adult representative); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6301(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(2)–(3) (Supp. 2011)
(permitting minors over the age of twelve to seek protection orders without an adult
representative); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(2)(a) (indicating that minors who are at
least sixteen do not need a guardian or next friend to pursue their order for protection).
164. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1)(C)–(D); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a).
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1).
166. Id. § 372(b)(1)(D).
167. D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(2)–(3). But see infra note 187 and accompanying text. The
District of Columbia defines “intimate partner violence” as a criminal act or threat upon a
“romantic, dating, or sexual” partner, among other things. D.C. CODE § 16-1001(7)(c). The
District of Columbia’s statute clearly articulates that minors ages twelve to fifteen years may only
file for protection orders against respondents other than intimate partners, such as family
members and cohabitants, if a parent or another appropriate adult files on the minor’s behalf. Id.
§ 16-1003(a)(4). The D.C. Code does not specify whether and under what circumstances minors
twelve to fifteen years of age may file petitions for protection orders against stalkers or sexual
assailants. See id.
168. D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 2011).
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sixteen and older are “not required to seek relief by a guardian or next
friend.”169
In addition, two states grant minor petitioners the legal capacity to seek
protection orders without regard to age.170 New Hampshire grants minor
petitioners legal capacity in all cases,171 and Texas grants minors legal capacity
in cases against dating partners.172
A less explicit group of statutes designates specific ages at which minors
may file petitions for protection orders, but remains silent on whether minors
may represent themselves in related court proceedings.173 These statutes,
although ambiguous, suggest strongly that minors who have attained the
prerequisite ages for filing are permitted to represent their own interests
throughout the litigation.
Missouri, for example, designates minors seventeen and older as “adults” for
purposes of the protection-order remedy.174 This accords seventeen-year-olds
standing to seek protection orders against respondents in any qualifying
relationship.175 Although Missouri’s statute says nothing about whether these
minor petitioners require an adult representative to assist them in the filing and
litigation of their claims, the statute’s inclusion of seventeen-year-olds within
the definition of “adult” and the restriction of the remedy to adult victims
suggest that courts should treat victims seventeen years of age in the same
manner as other adults.
Utah’s statute, which includes minors sixteen and older within the definition
of “cohabitant,”176 permits all cohabitants who have experienced abuse or who
are at risk of abuse to “seek” a protection order.177 This suggests that Utah
courts treat sixteen and seventeen-year-olds the same as adult petitioners in
proceedings related to protection orders.
Similarly, under Oklahoma’s protection-order statute, minors sixteen and
older are explicitly permitted to “seek relief,” which includes filing a petition
for a protection order.178 Because Oklahoma is silent with regard to the
involvement of adult representatives for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(2)(a) (2005 & Supp. 2011). But see infra note
187 and accompanying text.
170. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 172-B:3(II)(b) (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.002(b)(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
171. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II)(b) (“A minor plaintiff need not be accompanied by
a parent or guardian to receive relief . . . .”).
172. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(b)(1) (“[A]n application for a protective order to
protect the applicant may be filed by: (1) a member of the dating relationship, regardless of
whether the member is an adult or a child.”).
173. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(2) (West Supp. 2011); id. § 455.020 (West 2003).
174. Id. § 455.010(2).
175. Id. § 455.020.
176. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
177. Id. § 78B-7-103(1).
178. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(A)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
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petitioners, and is explicit in requiring adult representatives to file petitions on
behalf of minors under sixteen,179 it may be inferred that sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old petitioners have the capacity to represent their own
interests in protection-order proceedings.
Similarly, Tennessee’s articulation of detailed procedures for filing and
notifying adults when minor petitioners initiate proceedings, contrasted with its
silence regarding adult participation in related court proceedings, suggests that
minor petitioners may represent themselves in court.180
b. Legal Capacity According to Subjective Standards
Instead of drawing a bright line based on age and relationship, at least two
jurisdictions require that courts make a threshold inquiry into a minor
petitioner’s character and circumstances to determine whether she should be
accorded the legal capacity to pursue a protection order on her own.181
Minnesota permits minors sixteen and older to seek protection orders on their
own behalf against “a spouse or former spouse, or a person with whom the
minor has a child in common if the court determines that the minor has
sufficient maturity and judgment and that it is in the best interests of the
minor.”182 Moreover, Arizona permits courts to award minors capacity to seek
protection orders on their own behalf on a case-by-case basis.183 The statute
requires that parents, guardians, and custodians file petitions for minor victims
“unless the court determines otherwise.”184
2. Statutes Denying Legal Capacity
Only a handful of states address the circumstances in which minors are
denied the capacity to seek protection orders on their own. Seven states
explicitly deny legal capacity to all minors to represent their interests in
protection-order proceedings, and instead require that certain adults pursue

179. See id. § 60.2(A) (requiring an adult or emancipated-minor household member to seek
relief for a victim under sixteen).
180. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2010); see also infra Part III.C. The Tennessee
statute vaguely addresses representation issues for minor petitioners who also are the subjects of
ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings in juvenile court. In such cases, the Tennessee
Department of Child Services or the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the child in the
juvenile court proceeding is empowered to file a petition on behalf of the minor petitioner and
thereby is presumably authorized to represent the minor’s interests in attendant court proceedings.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b). The statute does not provide for adults to file petitions on
behalf of minors in other circumstances. See id.
181. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(A) (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(a)
(West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(a).
183. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(A).
184. Id.
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protection-order claims on behalf of the minors affected.185 Two jurisdictions
permit older minors to represent their own interests,186 but require younger
minors—in the District of Columbia, those under twelve and in Washington,
those under sixteen—to pursue protection-order claims through adult
representatives, which may include an attorney or a guardian ad litem or
parent.187 Four additional states, by explicitly extending legal capacity to
minors over a certain age, implicitly deny legal capacity to minors who have
not reached the age threshold.188
3. Ambiguous or Silent Statutes
In contrast to the group of protection-order statutes previously discussed,
most protection-order statutes say nothing about the legal capacity of minor
parties to file and litigate claims for protection orders independently.189
a. Silent Statutes
Several state protection-order statutes make no mention of age in their
descriptions of court proceedings and filing procedures.190 These statutes’
185. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-2(2), 30-5-5(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1989 & Supp. 2010) (defining a
“child” as a person under the age of nineteen, providing that only adults may seek protection
orders, and permitting protection orders to be filed by plaintiffs or by parents, guardians,
custodians, or the State Department of Human Resources on behalf of minors); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2009) (requiring protection orders to be filed on behalf of minors by adult
family or household members or by people working for domestic violence shelters and
programs); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2010) (“A person who is not a minor may seek relief
under this article by filing a petition with the superior court alleging one or more acts of family
violence. A person who is not a minor may also seek relief on behalf of a minor by filing such a
petition.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(c) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (“An adult may seek relief
under this Part by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant. Any parent,
adult household member, or district attorney may seek relief on behalf of any minor child . . . .”);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4005(1) (1998 & Supp. 2010) (permitting only adults
responsible for a minor or the department of child and family services to seek a protection order
on behalf of a minor); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (“An adult
or an emancipated minor may seek relief under this chapter for that person or any parent, adult
household member, or guardian ad litem may seek relief under this chapter on behalf of minor
children . . . by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.”); see also MICH.
CT. R. 3.703(F)(1) (providing that in the context of protection-order proceedings, “[i]f the
petitioner is a minor or a legally incapacitated individual, the petitioner shall proceed through a
next friend. The petitioner shall certify that the next friend is not disqualified by statute and that
the next friend is an adult”). Michigan court rules further provide that next friends may serve
without court appointment when minor petitioners are fourteen years of age and older. MICH. CT.
R. 3.703(F)(2).
186. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
187. D.C. CODE § 16-1003 (Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020 (2005
& Supp. 2011).
188. See supra notes 164–66, 176–79, 181 and accompanying text.
189. See infra Parts III.B.3.a–b.
190. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (“A person
suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or household member may file a
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silence does not resolve whether minor petitioners have the legal capacity
represent their interests in protection-order proceedings.
b. Ambiguous Statutes Implying the Denial of Legal Capacity to Minors
A number of protection-order statutes appear to implicitly deny minor
petitioners the legal capacity to pursue their claims independently. The
statutes in this group detail the extent to which adults have standing to seek
relief on behalf of minor victims.191 Although this inquiry is entirely separate
complaint . . . requesting protection from abuse.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020(1)–(2)
(LexisNexis 2006) (providing no information concerning who may file a petition); id. § 42-924(1)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (permitting “[a]ny victim of domestic abuse” to seek a protection
order); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-28(a), 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (permitting any
“victim” to seek a protection order, but not specifying who may appear at the court proceedings);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (permitting “a victim of domestic abuse” to
file); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 822 (McKinney 2010) (permitting “any person” with a qualifying
relationship to the respondent to file a petition for a protection order); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02(1) (2009 & Supp. 2011) (permitting petitions to be filed by “any family or
household member” or by “any other person” if the court finds the relationship between the
parties to warrant the issuance of a protection order); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.710(1) (West
2003 & Supp. 2010) (permitting “[a]ny person who has been the victim of abuse within the
preceding 180 days” to file a petition); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.1-3(a); 15-15-3(a) (1997 & Supp.
2010) (permitting “[a] person suffering from domestic abuse” to file a petition for a protection
order); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3(1) (2004) (permitting petitions to be made by “any family
or household member”); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (permitting a
protection order to be issued “[u]pon the filing of a petition alleging that the petitioner is or has
been, within a reasonable period of time, subjected to family abuse”).
191. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2010) (permitting “parent[s], guardian[s], or
other representative[s] appointed by the court . . . [to] file a petition for a protective order on
behalf of a minor,” and granting courts the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem or an attorney
to represent a minor where a petition has been filed on the minor’s behalf); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-14-102(b)(I)(B), 13-14-103(c) (2011) (providing that a permanent “protection order may be
modified or dismissed on the motion of the protected person, or the person’s attorney, parent or
legal guardian if a minor”); id. § 13-14-103(1)(c) (permitting courts to issue emergency
protection orders to benefit a minor child “when requested by the local law enforcement agency,
the county department of social services, or a responsible person”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1041(3) (1999 & Supp. 2010) (permitting members of protected classes to seek protection
orders for themselves and their minor children and permitting Child Protective Services to seek
protection orders on behalf of minor children); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(2)(a)–(c) (West 2007
& Supp. 2011) (permitting “the parent or legal guardian of any minor child who is living at
home” to file a petition for a protection order on behalf of a minor victim of dating, sexual, or
repeat violence); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting “[a]ny
family or household member” and any state agency to seek a protection order on behalf of a
minor family or household member); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6304(2) (2011) (permitting parents
and guardians to seek protection orders on behalf of minors); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
60/201(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (permitting “any person [to file] on behalf of a minor
child”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(b) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (“A parent, a guardian,
or another representative may file a petition for an order of protection on behalf of a child . . . .”);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (permitting parents and guardians to file on
behalf of unemancipated minors); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104(b) (2005 & Supp. 2009)
(permitting parents or other adults residing with a minor child to seek relief on the minor’s
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from the question of minors’ capacity to represent their own interests, these
statutes could be interpreted as addressing both the issues in tandem by
simultaneously extending standing rights to adults to act for minors and also
precluding minors from exercising capacity to pursue claims without the
involvement of a designated adult representative.
4. Emancipated Minors
Although emancipation does not necessarily confer standing to sue,192
complete emancipation does remove a minor’s legal incapacity to pursue legal
claims that he or she has standing to assert.193 Because emancipation removes
the legal disabilities of minority, including legal incapacity, emancipated
minors generally have the legal capacity to sue and be sued on their own
behalf, without the need for appointment of an adult representative.194
At least one state, however, expressly treats some groups of emancipated
minors as minors for capacity purposes in protection-order cases.195
Arkansas’s protection-order statute makes clear that a married minor, like other
minors, may only seek protection orders through a petition filed on her behalf
behalf); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(3) (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting protection-order
petitions to be filed by “the family member or member of an unmarried couple seeking relief or
by an adult family member or member of an unmarried couple on behalf of a minor family
member”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(m)(2)(ii)(1)–(4) (LexisNexis 2006) (describing
those entitled to file petitions for protection orders on behalf of minors); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-7(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (permitting “any person” to seek a protection order for
herself and “[a]ny parent, adult household member, or next friend” to seek a protection order on
behalf of any minor child); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(3) (2011) (“A parent, guardian ad
litem, or other representative of the petitioner may file a petition for an order of protection on
behalf of a minor petitioner against the petitioner’s abuser. At its discretion, a court may appoint
a guardian ad litem for a minor petitioner.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 (2009) (permitting “[a]ny
person residing in this state” to seek a protection order for herself or on behalf of a minor child
residing with or in her custody); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(c) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.
2011) (“A person may seek relief under this section on the person’s own behalf, or any parent or
adult household member may seek relief under this section on behalf of any other family or
household member.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(a) (1985 & Supp. 2010) (“A petition for
relief . . . may be made by any household members in need of protection or by any household
members on behalf of minor household members.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a) (2010)
(“Any family or household member may seek relief from abuse by another family or household
member on behalf of him or herself or his or her children by filing a complaint . . . .”).
192. See supra Part III.A.4.
193. See Hefel ex rel. D.M.H. v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1998) (explaining
that emancipated minors can sue in their own names).
194. See, e.g., W. Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr.
2d 612, 621–22 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Once emancipated, a minor is under no legal disability with
respect to bringing his or her own claims.”); id. (“Emancipated persons under the age of eighteen
are not under the disability of minority and for that reason could sue in their own names.”); Lee v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 433 So. 2d 903, 904 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (“Regardless of the form of
emancipation, an emancipated minor has the legal capacity to sue.” (citations omitted)).
195. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2009) (classifying married minors as
minors for capacity purposes).
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by an adult family or household member or an employee or volunteer of a
domestic-violence shelter or program.196
C. Parent Notification
In addition to standing and capacity requirements, in two states and the
District of Columbia, teens must satisfy parent-notification mandates to access
protection orders.197 In California and the District of Columbia, teens twelve
years of age and older have the right to file petitions for civil protection orders
and to represent themselves in related proceedings without involving a parent,
under certain circumstances.198 However, when a teen chooses to appear
before the court without a parent in both of these states, the court must notify a
parent about the case, unless the court determines that notifying a parent would
contravene the minor’s best interests.199 In Tennessee, unemancipated teens
may file a petition for a protective order, but only if a teen’s parent, guardian,
or caseworker signs the petition.200 If only caseworker signed a minor’s filed
petition, the court must serve a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and any
ex parte protection order on the minor’s parent, unless doing so would threaten
the minor with serious harm.201
IV. HOW CIVIL PROTECTION-ORDER LAWS PREVENT TEENS FROM ACCESSING
JUSTICE
Although some progress has been made in recent years, today civil
protection orders remain largely inaccessible to teens who have experienced
abuse. State protection-order statutes create barriers for teens who need access
to the justice system. States exclude teens from protections by restricting
standing requirements by age and by the relationship between the parties.202
Even when states extend standing to teens, states often deter teens from
pursuing protection orders by restricting their legal capacity and requiring
them to enlist adults to seek protections on their behalf,203 or by requiring that
parents be notified that teens have initiated cases on their own.204 Reforms are
needed to encourage abused teens to come forward and to ensure that they
have ready access to justice when they seek legal intervention.
196. Id.
197. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE
§ 16-1004(e) (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2010).
198. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a) (West 2004); D.C.
CODE § 16-1003(a)(2)–(3).
199. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(2); D.C. CODE § 16-1004(e).
200. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b). Minors may not file petitions only signed by a
caseworker against the minor’s parent or legal guardian. Id.
201. Id.
202. See supra Part III.A.2.
203. See supra Part III.B.2.
204. See supra Part III.C.
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A. Standing
Protection-order statutes conclusively exclude teens by denying them
standing. Without standing, teens are entirely foreclosed from pursuing
protection orders in a jurisdiction. Statutes with standing restrictions exclude
teen victims by imposing three primary limitations: petitioner age
restrictions,205 respondent age restrictions,206 and limitations on qualifying
relationships.207
1. Petitioner Age Restrictions
Several state statutes expressly restrict standing to seek protection orders to
adults or minors over a certain age.208 Although the reasons for denying
standing to teens vary by state, they likely stem from two broader sources.
First, legislative drafters did not consider teens when the protection-order
remedy was first created.209 As Pamela Saperstein has described:
When states first began passing domestic violence statutes, teen
dating violence was not yet a societal concern. At that time, society
was just beginning to recognize adult domestic violence as a
community problem. . . . This recognition was limited to a husband’s
violence towards his wife and did not include dating violence.210
Moreover, surprisingly little law exists that addresses the rights and obligations
of minors in the United States.211 Indeed, “there is nothing in the [U.S.]
Constitution about children, minors or infants, or parents for that matter.”212
Thus, it is possible that state legislatures may continue to overlook abuse in
teen relationships as a problem meriting legal intervention.
A second possibility is that some jurisdictions believe that the
protection-order remedy is inappropriate for teens.213 This view may stem
from a belief that teen romantic relationships in general are inappropriate, and,
therefore, the state should not legitimize them by offering them legal

205. See infra Part IV.A.1.
206. See infra Part IV.A.2.
207. See infra Part IV.A.3.
208. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
209. See Saperstein, supra note 18, at 183 (noting that when states started to enact
domestic-violence statutes, the issue of violence in teen dating relationships was not a concern).
210. Id.
211. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 40
(observing the way in which the Supreme Court has treated children under the Constitution and
noting that “where children need special treatment for the very reason that they are not
adults . . . the Court is often oblivious to their interests”).
212. Id. at 1.
213. See Largio, supra note 62, at 978–79 (addressing the arguments of opponents who reject
the idea that teen relationships should be addressed by domestic-violence statutes).
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protection.214 On the other hand, this view may reflect a belief that teen
relationships are simply not an appropriate subject of public, legal
intervention.215 The same arguments used to justify non-intervention in
abusive adult relationships—before the battered women’s movement—are
often raised to justify excluding teens from the protection-order remedy
today.216 Opponents of giving teens access to protection orders argue that
problems in teen relationships are private matters that should be addressed by
parents, not the state.217 Some also argue that teen abusive behavior is just
kids being kids, as opposed to serious or criminal conduct,218 and that alternate
remedies exist to offer teens sufficient protection.219
To best protect teens, states should grant standing to seek protection orders
to all victims of abuse, regardless of age. Numerous studies show that teen
dating violence is a pervasive, serious, and lasting problem across the United
States.220 Teens and children are as deserving of legal protection from abuse
as adults. Just as states have rejected the once conventional notion that
domestic violence in adult relationships is a private matter,221 states must also
reject the idea that teen violence is a private matter. By failing to accord teens
standing to seek protection orders, states send the message that the abuse of
teens is not serious and not worthy of state attention.222
Directing minors to alternative legal remedies is not an effective solution.
As one commentator noted, “To contend that existing criminal and civil laws
are enough to protect teen victims ignores the fact that domestic violence laws
developed precisely because existing laws did not adequately protect adult
intimate violence victims.”223 The alternate avenues of recourse that are often
recommended to abused minors, such as seeking modification of their parents’
or their own custody or visitation orders, pursuing (non-domestic violence)
civil injunctions, or initiating abuse and neglect cases, provide neither the same
expedient, low-cost relief from present abuse, nor the effective prevention of
214. Id. (acknowledging the moral argument raised by some who feel that “serious teen
relationships or sexual activity should not be condoned”).
215. See id. (suggesting that families should handle issues regarding teen dating violence).
216. See SCHECHTER, supra note 45, at 158, 162–62, 166 (describing how law-enforcement
and court perceptions of domestic violence as a personal problem resulted in police and courts
ignoring and discouraging requests for assistance with abuse).
217. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 451 (rejecting the contention that intimate-partner violence
is a private problem).
218. Sousa, supra note 22, at 362–63.
219. Suarez, supra note 23, at 451.
220. See supra Part I (describing statistics on teen dating violence).
221. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 451 (emphasizing legislatures’ recognition of domestic
violence as a “social plague”).
222. See Angel, supra note 65, at 295 (“If the harm of gender violence is not recognized by
society, then its victims understand, explicitly or implicitly, that society doesn’t value them, that
they are objects without rights.”).
223. Suarez, supra note 23, at 451.
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future harm offered by protection orders.224 Instead, each of these alternative
remedies is procedurally lengthy, complex, and costly to pursue.225
Furthermore, none of these alternatives offers the broad range of remedies
aimed at assisting the petitioner in achieving self-sufficiency, or carries the
threat of criminal penalties for violation promised by protection orders.226
Finally, in many jurisdictions in which domestic-violence advocates are
available to assist petitioners, the protection-order process can provide an
important opportunity to connect teens with advocates and social-service
providers who can help teens safety plan and address other issues that might
encourage them to remain in abusive relationships.227
The child-protection-order remedy created in several states is likewise
inadequate to address violence in teen dating relationships.228 First, child
protection orders typically may be sought only by selected adults, usually
parents and guardians, on behalf of abused minors and, therefore, are useful
only when such adults are aware of the abuse and concerned enough to seek
legal intervention.229 For the same reason, child protection orders deny abused
teens the agency to seek court assistance on their own. Second, child
protection orders are often available in much more limited circumstances than

224. See, e.g., Egelman ex rel. Egelman v. Egelman, 728 A.2d 360, 364, 366 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (holding that the trial court could not require a mother to address future concerns about her
child’s welfare exclusively in a custody action, rather than in a protection-order proceeding,
because neither the custody nor abuse and neglect proceedings offered the emergency relief
provided by protection orders, and the standard of proof required to obtain a protection order was
much lower than that required for intervention in child-abuse proceedings); Viruet ex rel.
Velasquez v. Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (describing the different legal
standards and purposes served by the remedies that protection orders and child-abuse proceedings
offer to abused minors); Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 871 (S.D. 1997) (describing
the failure of the trial court’s suggested alternate remedies to address the needs of a minor victim
of domestic violence, such as a minor’s reliance on his or her mother to act in custody
proceedings, the higher standard of proof and level of intervention in abuse and neglect
proceedings, and the failure of either alternative to offer expedient relief).
225. See, e.g., Beermann, 559 N.W.2d at 871 (stating that the trial court’s suggested
alternative remedies are more costly and drawn out compared to the simplified, inexpensive, and
immediate relief offered by protection orders).
226. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 445 (stating that “generic civil and penal remedies” are
insufficient to address teen dating violence because “they do not encompass the myriad of
additional legal protections contained in domestic violence legislation”).
227. Id. at 462 (highlighting the benefits that social services offer to domestic-violence
victims, but noting that teens may be excluded from such benefits if they are not statutorily
defined as domestic-violence victims).
228. See e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.503 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.400(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.122(2) (West 2007
& Supp. 2011).
229. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.503 (requiring a parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, or
juvenile officer to file on behalf of a child); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.400(1) (requiring a
parent or guardian to petition the court on a child’s behalf). But see WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.122(2) (indicating that child victims may petition for child protection orders on their own).
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domestic-violence protection orders.230 For example, child protection orders in
Nevada are available only against individuals who are at least eighteen and
who the petitioning guardian “reasonably believes” has committed the
abuse.231 Thus, child protection orders would not be available against minor
dating partners. Finally, child protection orders typically offer fewer remedies
for victims than domestic-violence protection orders.232 The only remedies
available in child protection orders in Wisconsin, for example, are orders
requiring a respondent to stay away from a child’s residence and refrain from
By contrast, Wisconsin’s domestic-violence
contacting the child.233
protection-order statute authorizes courts to order a respondent to stay away
from the petitioner’s residence, refrain from contacting the petitioner, refrain
from committing domestic violence, and, most importantly, grant “any other
appropriate remedy not inconsistent with the remedies requested in the
petition.”234
States should not only extend standing to teens themselves, but also should
explicitly accord standing to parents or other adults with close relationships to
a teen to seek protection orders on the teen’s behalf. Taking this additional
step permits concerned adults to protect teens from further abuse.235 This is
important because, given their age and inexperience, teens may not understand
the gravity of the risks posed to them or the possibility that the legal system
could help.236 On the other hand, teens are autonomous individuals, and their
personal perspectives and desires should be afforded the dignity and respect
they deserve.237 Consequently, when an adult seeks a protection order on a
teen’s behalf, courts should be required to solicit the teen’s perspective on
whether a protection order should be issued and what remedies, if any, are
appropriate.238 Requiring courts to obtain the teen’s perspective not only

230. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.400(1) (permitting an adult to petition on a
minor’s behalf only when the respondent is eighteen or older and the parent “reasonably believes”
that he or she has committed the crime).
231. Id.
232. Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.122(4) (barring only contact by the respondent with
the child victim), with id. § 813.12(3) (enumerating specific remedies, but also permitting any
remedy that may be appropriate).
233. Id. § 813.122(4).
234. Id. § 813.12(3).
235. Karan & Keating, supra note 28, at 26 (noting that parents may need to take legal action
upon observing signs of abuse, despite their teen’s wishes).
236. See id. (encouraging parents to take action even if teens object).
237. See id. (arguing that in cases brought by an adult on a minor victim’s behalf, “the minor
victim should be given the opportunity to speak. The court should treat the minor victim as a
participant, not an observer . . . [and] regard the minor petitioner the same as an adult abuse
victim”).
238. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2011) (“[I]f a parent, guardian,
custodian, or other appropriate adult has petitioned for civil protection on behalf of a minor
petitioner 12 years of age or older, the court shall consider the expressed wishes of the minor
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respects the teen’s autonomy and dignity, but it also facilitates the
truth-seeking process and discourages parents and other adults from misusing
the protection-order process for inappropriate purposes, such as terminating
relationships of which they disapprove.239
2. Respondent Age Restrictions
Several state statutes make protection orders available only against adult
respondents or minor respondents above a certain age.240 Although it is
difficult to know with certainty why these restrictions exist, they likely stem
from perceptions that domestic violence remedies are too harsh for minor
respondents or from concerns about the potential negative impact of protection
orders, or prosecutions for protection-order violations, on minor respondents in
the long term.

petitioner in deciding whether to issue an order pursuant to this section and in determining the
contents of such an order.”).
239. See, e.g., Claver v. Wilbur, 280 S.W.3d 570, 570, 573–74 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)
(dismissing a civil protection order that a mother obtained on behalf of her sixteen-year-old
daughter against the daughter’s boyfriend on the grounds that “[t]he mere fact that [the minor’s]
parents do not like appellant was not a proper ground upon which to issue an order of protection
in the absence of evidence of actual physical harm or the fear of imminent physical harm”); cf.
J.K.T. ex rel. R.T.T. v. Ringer, 26 S.W.3d 830, 837–38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam)
(dismissing a child protection order that a father obtained on behalf of his teenage daughter
against her boyfriend because the evidence demonstrated that the relationship was consensual and
non-abusive, and stating that “[t]here is no indication that the legislature intended these statutes to
be used by a parent as a means of controlling the actions of that parent’s child”).
240. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(B)(2) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting the issuance
of a protection order against minors twelve years old or younger); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-14-102(b)(IV)(15) (2011) (permitting protection orders to be issued against adults or
juveniles ten years of age or older); D.C. CODE § 16-1001(13) (Supp. 2011) (defining a
respondent as person twelve years of age or older); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(4)
(1998 & Supp. 2010) (permitting minor children of a household to seek protection orders against
adult household members). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 4002(3-A), 4005
(defining dating partners and allowing for protection orders against stalkers and sexual assailants
without specified age limitations); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(27) (West 2010)
(permitting courts to issue protection orders against minors ten and older, unless “[t]he
respondent is the unemancipated minor child of the petitioner”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50B-1(b)(3) (2009 & Supp. 2010) (permitting parents to file protection orders against minor
children sixteen years of age or older); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011)
(providing that abuse by a minor is not “domestic violence”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1(1)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (permitting protection orders against minors thirteen years of age and
older); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.726(2) (2003) (prohibiting minors from seeking protection
orders against minor respondents, but remaining silent on whether adults are prohibited from
seeing protection orders against minors); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1), (3) (permitting protection
orders only against adult cohabitants); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2) (West 2005
& Supp. 2010) (permitting protection orders against minor respondents sixteen years of age or
older who are or were in a dating relationship with or who currently or formerly resided with
petitioner); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(5)(a)(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting the entry
of domestic-abuse protection orders against minors).
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Notwithstanding these concerns, in order to best combat teen dating
violence, statutes should permit protection orders to be sought against
respondents ages twelve and older. In reality, teen petitioners seeking
protection against dating partners are likely to be filing against adults—often
young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.241 Nonetheless, it
is critical for the protection-order remedy to be available against teen
respondents. Just as the failure to grant teen petitioners access to protection
orders based on their age demonstrates the state’s lack of concern about teen
victims, a state’s failure to make protection orders available against teen
respondents based on their age sends the message that abusive conduct by
teens is trivial and unworthy of state attention.242 This position is untenable.
Like adults, teen perpetrators of abuse need to be held accountable for their
actions.
Because accountability depends on a respondent’s ability to understand the
nature and consequences of his actions, courts should not issue protection
Recognizing that teens often report
orders against younger minors.243
involvement in dating relationships beginning in middle school,244 it is
appropriate to issue protection orders against respondents twelve and older.
Concerns about the potential of imposing criminal penalties against minor
respondents for protection-order violations should not preclude the availability
of protection orders against minor perpetrators. Lawmakers can ensure that
protection-order enforcement mechanisms are age-appropriate for minor
respondents by requiring enforcement proceedings against minors to take place
in juvenile courts in accordance with juvenile laws and procedures.245

241. For example, in the District of Columbia in 2010, minors filed petitions for protection
orders against dating partners in twenty-six cases. Of these, sixteen cases were filed against
respondents ages eighteen to twenty-four, six cases were filed against respondents ages fifteen to
seventeen, and two cases were filed against respondents ages twenty-eight to twenty-nine. 2010
Data on Petitions by Minors for Protection Orders in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (on file with author) [hereinafter 2010 D.C. Petition Data].
242. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 424 (stating that if teen dating violence is “largely ignored
by society and the legal system, a whole new generation’s acts of violence will be cultivated and
condoned”).
243. See Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child’s Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1907 (1996) (arguing that courts “should assume that, in the
absence of specific evidence to the contrary, children below the age of ten are incapable of
rational thought”).
244. See TEENAGE RESEARCH UNLIMITED & LIZ CLAIBORNE INC., TWEEN AND TEEN
DATING VIOLENCE AND ABUSE STUDY 6 (2008) [hereinafter TWEEN AND TEEN DATING
VIOLENCE AND ABUSE STUDY], available at http://www.loveisrespect.org/wp-content/uploads
/2008/07/tru-tween-teen-study-feb-081.pdf (documenting that forty-seven percent of minors ages
eleven to fourteen have been in a dating relationship).
245. See Diehl v. Drummond, 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 376, 378–79 (1989) (holding that petitions
for protection orders may be filed against minor respondents and directing that any proceedings to
enforce an order violated by a minor respondent should be held in accordance with juvenile
procedures).
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3. Qualifying Relationships
Several state statutes continue to restrict the availability of protection orders
by limiting the categories of qualifying relationships. Such restrictions
disproportionately impact teens because the qualifying relationships in these
states are infrequently shared by teens. These restrictions stem in part from the
historical development of the protection-order remedy. Initially, protection
orders in most states were available only against spouses.246 Over time, as
awareness grew that domestic violence was not exclusive to marriage,
jurisdictions began to expand their protection-order statutes to encompass
additional personal relationships, including blood relatives, persons who share
a child in common, and household members. 247 Since the mid-1990s, many
states have begun to expand their protection-order remedies to protect victims
of abuse who are not related to perpetrators by traditional marriage or family
ties.248 Forty-two states and the District of Columbia now permit individuals
to obtain protection orders in “romantic” or “dating” relationships.249 Nineteen
states sanction protection orders against perpetrators who sexually assaulted
the petitioner, regardless of the relationship between the parties.250 Thirty-one
states offer protection orders to victims against stalkers, regardless of the

246. See Smith, supra note 50, at 98 (observing that before the 1970s, victims of domestic
violence could only seek a protection order through the divorce court).
247. Id. at 102 (describing that as of 1995, “thirty-three states limited the availability of civil
protection orders to individuals who were married, related by blood, shared a child, or were living
with the respondent”).
248. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 339, 352 n.47 (1995).
249. See BREAK THE CYCLE, 2010 STATE LAW REPORT CARDS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
TEEN DATING VIOLENCE LAWS 7 (2010), available at http://www.breakthecycle.org/
sites/default/files/pdf/2010-Dating-Violence-State-Law-Report-Card-Full-Report.pdf (indicating
that as of 2010, forty-one states included dating relationships as those permitted to access
protection orders); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(5)(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (including
dating relationships in the 2010 supplement).
250. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.850 (2010); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a)–(b)(1) (West
2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(1.5)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 784.046(2)(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/103 (West
2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4002(1)(A), 4005(1) (Supp. 2010) (permitting any victims of sexual assault by
family, household members, or dating partners to file a complaint); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-1503(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(1)(a)(1),
(2) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 455.010(1)(e), 455.020(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(2)(a) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50C-1(7)(a), 50C-2(a)(1)
(2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.2(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 22-1-2(9), 22-19A-8 (2006 & Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(7) (2010 & Supp.
2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5133(a) (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.90.010 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(1), (3) (West 2007
& Supp. 2010).
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parties’ relationship.251 Concern for teen safety often has motivated these
developments.252
Notwithstanding these developments, a few states continue to restrict the
protection-order remedy to family or adult relationships, such as spouses and
cohabitants.253 The persistence of such restrictions likely stems from inertia or
views on what relationships are appropriate and worthy of state recognition
and intervention.254 Statutes that restrict protection orders to married couples,
cohabitants, or individuals who share a child generally do not encompass
teenagers and thus are inadequate to protect teens. Teens are much more likely
to experience dating relationships than marriage, cohabitation, or
parenthood.255 Abuse often begins during pregnancy, yet under these
categories, pregnant teens who have not yet given birth and who have not
married or moved in with the father-to-be may not be able to seek
251. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.850(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 527.6(a)–(b)(3); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(1.5)(d); D.C. CODE § 16-1001(12) (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 784.046(1)(a)–(b), 2(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)(1), (d) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 604-10.5(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); id. § 711-1106.5(1) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(a)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-31a02(a), 60-31a04(a) (2005
& Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1503(a)(7); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2950a(3)(f)–(k) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.20(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(2)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-311.03 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.591(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D)(1) (West Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50C-1(7)(b), 50C-5(a) (2009 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211(A),
2903.214(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2; OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30.866(1)(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1750(A) (2003 &
Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-8; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.292(a)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art.
42.072(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3a-101(2) (LexisNexis 2008
& Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5133(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.46.110(1) (West
2009 & Supp. 2010); id. § 10.14.040 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(1);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-506(a)(iii), 7-3-507(a) (2011).
252. See, e.g., COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY OF THE COUNCIL OF D.C., COMMITTEE REPORT ON
BILL 10-477, at 3–5 (1994) (summarizing the remarks of several witnesses who testified before
the D.C. Council to emphasize the importance to teens of extending protection-order statutes to
dating relationships); Brian Mori, Domestic Violence Law Now Extended, ARIZ. DAILY
WILDCAT, Dec. 9, 2009, at A1. The Arizona legislature passed “Kaity’s law” to extend
protection orders to dating relationships after seventeen-year-old Kaity Sudberry was murdered
by her boyfriend in Phoenix. Id. Her family had been unable to seek a protection order for her
because the statute previously had not covered dating relationships. Id.
253. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(1)–(2), (4) (LexisNexis 2010) (applying
protections for domestic abuse only to family members or to unmarried couples who share a child
together or live together).
254. See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text.
255. See Brustin, supra note 18, at 339 (highlighting the fact that the protected categories of
abuse victims do not apply to teens); Largio, supra note 62, at 958 (advocating that
protection-order statutes extending to dating relationships are “the most likely to allow young
people to seek orders of protection, because teenagers engage in dating relationships more often
than they marry or have children”).

2012]

Securing Access to Justice for Teens

495

protection.256 Moreover, teens are at significant risk of sexual assault257 and
stalking.258 Consequently, many jurisdictions have recognized that to protect
abused teens most effectively, states should make protection orders available in
dating and sexual relationships, as well as against perpetrators of sexual assault
and stalking.
B. Legal Capacity and Parent Notification
Even where states extend standing to teens, protection-order statutes deter
teens from seeking legal relief by denying them legal capacity and mandating
parent notification of teens’ legal claims.259 To best protect teens, states
should grant teen petitioners the legal capacity to file and litigate claims for
protection orders on their own, without notifying parents, and accord courts the
authority to appoint attorneys to represent teen petitioners who need assistance
in related proceedings.
1. Legal Capacity
Only a minority of states grants teens the legal capacity to represent their
own interests in protection-order proceedings.260 States likely have been slow
to accord capacity rights to teen petitioners for several reasons. First, the
extent of minors’ legal capacity as parties in civil matters, generally, is

256. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 333 (discussing a study that found that twenty-six percent
of pregnant teens experienced abuse from their dating partner during the pregnancy); Jay G.
Silverman et al., Dating Violence and Associated Sexual Risk and Pregnancy Among Adolescent
Girls in the United States, 114 PEDIATRICS e220, e223 (2004) (finding that girls who are victims
of dating violence are twice as likely than non-abused girls to become pregnant).
257. See HARNER, supra note 15, at 2; see also ANJANI CHANDRA ET AL., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 76
(2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf (finding that
approximately fourteen to nineteen percent of young women ages eighteen to twenty-four have
experienced forced sexual intercourse); MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 4 (2009),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (finding that young women ages
sixteen to twenty-four experience the highest rates of rape and sexual assault).
258. KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 3 (2009), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalkingvictimization.pdf (concluding that the highest rates of stalking victimization occurs in persons
ages eighteen to twenty-four); PATRICIA TADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE
& CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STALKING IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 6 (1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf (finding
that twelve percent of stalking victims were less than eighteen years of age at the time of the first
stalking incident).
259. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.C.
260. See supra Part III.B.1.
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codified or addressed in court rules in every state.261 As a result, legislators
might not have perceived a need to address capacity specifically in the context
of protection-order proceedings. Second, because capacity restrictions are
intended to guarantee that minors and incompetent adults are able to advance
their interests in court proceedings effectively, states might be concerned that
teens’ interests will not be adequately protected or vindicated in
protection-order proceedings without an adult representative.262 Third, states
might be concerned about the potential risks to parents by their children’s
abusive partners if minor children were permitted to seek protection orders
without notifying their parents.263 Fourth, states might be reluctant to encroach
upon parents’ desire and constitutional right to control the upbringing of their
children.264 From this perspective, just as parents are entitled to be aware of
events in their children’s lives and have input in major decisions affecting their
children, parents also have the right to be included in a child’s decision to seek
a protection order and to participate in attendant proceedings.265 Finally, some
might fear that without adult guidance, minors might seek protection orders
without cause and thus advocate for mandatory parental involvement in court
261. See Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors
from Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 853, 872–73 & tbl.2 (2009)
(detailing the laws and court rules addressing minors’ legal capacity in the fifty states and noting
that nearly all states have incorporated Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into
their statutes, or contain a similar rule requiring that a guardian or next friend appear on behalf of
minors).
262. See 4 MOORE, supra note 149, § 17.21[3][a], at 17-93-94 (noting the court’s role of
protecting the minor’s interests); Brustin, supra note 16, at 351 (addressing the argument that
minors are too immature to seek protection orders on their own behalf).
263. See Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra 28, at 3–4 (statement of
Patricia A. Riley, Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney) (arguing that courts should notify parents
when a minor seeks a protection order on her own, in part because “[k]eeping parents . . . in the
dark may place them and other children in the household at risk”).
264. See infra text accompanying note 265.
265. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (striking down a state law allowing
third-party petitions for child visitation rights over parental objection, holding that “[t]he liberty
interest at issue in this case—the interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992) (upholding Pennsylvania’s abortion
statute requiring parental consent and stating that the waiting period provided the opportunity for
parental consultation to discuss the moral consequences of abortion in a familial context); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 588 & n.3, 604, 620–21 (1979) (upholding Georgia’s mental-hospital
commitment statute, which permitted parents or guardians to request that their child be committed
if there was evidence of mental illness, because parental decisions regarding a child’s medical
care should receive great deference); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534–35 (1925)
(finding Oregon’s law requiring that students between ages eight and sixteen attend school to be
unconstitutional because it infringes on parents’ right to direct the upbringing and education of
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that a state could not
restrict school curricula because parents have the right to “control the education of their own”);
see also Brustin, supra note 16, at 351 (highlighting the continuing discussion in state legislatures
about when adolescents ought to be able to act autonomously).

2012]

Securing Access to Justice for Teens

497

proceedings to curtail improvident claims for protection.266 Although valid,
these concerns should not prevent states from according teens legal capacity.
To best protect abused teens, states should explicitly and unconditionally
grant teens twelve and older the legal capacity to file petitions for protection
orders on their own and represent their own interests in related court
proceedings. First, states are more likely to become aware of abuse in teen
relationships and be able to offer abused teens legal protection and supportive
services if states encourage teens to disclose abuse. A teen’s need for
immediate safety outweighs concerns about and should take priority over
protecting his or her interest in the litigation.267 The South Dakota Supreme
Court struck this balance in the context of a protection-order case, stating: “We
are not convinced that the need for a guardian at the petition stage outweighs
the need for immediate court protection.”268
Studies reveal that teens are often extremely reluctant to disclose abuse to
adults—especially parents.269 In the protection-order context, this means that
states that require adult involvement, especially parental involvement, in teen
protection-order cases will deter many teens from seeking legal protection
altogether.270
Many legitimate reasons exist for why teens may be reluctant or unable to
involve parents in the protection-order process. Teens may fear retribution,
ostracism, or worse when the family has prohibited dating or when parents are
unaware of teens’ sexual orientation.271 Teens may be concerned that

266. Cf. Brustin, supra note 16, at 351 (acknowledging the concern of some that “[a] minor
might not be mature enough . . . to weigh the consequences of seeking a protection order”).
267. See, e.g., Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 871 (S.D. 1997) (noting that
immediate safety outweighed the need of a guardian).
268. Id. (“In the middle of domestic strife, preserving the mental and emotional health of the
vulnerable must override other less compelling interests.” (quoting South Dakota v. Hauge, 547
N.W.2d 173, 176 (S.D. 1996))).
269. See supra notes 26–35 and accompanying text.
270. See Carlson, supra note 43, at 36 (“Because teens tend to reject assistance from adult
authorities and instead rely on peers, the fact that a teen must involve an adult in her restraining
order suit is frequently a deterrent to seeking legal help in all but the most serious cases.”); Sousa,
supra note 22, at 370 (noting that a requirement that a parent or guardian accompany a minor to
court is “a serious deterrent for the adolescent victim who, for a variety of reasons, may not have
told her parents about the abusive relationship”); see also KRISTINE HERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, YOUTH DATING VIOLENCE: CAN A COURT HELP BREAK THE CYCLE? 5 (2004),
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/youthdatingviolence.pdf (noting
that the victim advocate at the Brooklyn Youthful Offender Domestic Violence Court, a specialty
court concentrating on juvenile proceedings involving dating violence, has found that “teen
victims do not want their families involved in the [court] process”).
271. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. Teens participating in focus groups
convened by WEAVE in Washington, D.C. in December 2005 and January 2006 also voiced
these concerns. Focus Group by WEAVE with Teens, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2005 & Jan.
2006) [hereinafter WEAVE Focus Groups] (on file with the author).
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disclosure will result in lost autonomy and heightened parental supervision.272
A teen may have reason to know that a parent is likely to confront the abuser
and not want the abuser to be harmed, or fear that she may be subjected to
retaliatory violence by the abuser for having disclosed the abuse.273 Teens
might simply be concerned that parents will not keep the information
confidential.274 Even in cases in which teens have disclosed abuse to a parent,
the parent may be unable to come to court because of inflexible work
schedules or other obligations or because of a perception that a protection
order is unnecessary.275
Teens are often so reticent to disclose abuse to adults that by the time a teen
reaches out to the legal system for help, the abuse has often reached a crisis
point.276 Moreover, because the nature and severity of abuse often intensifies
over time and peaks during attempts at separation, teen victims seeking
protection orders likely face significant risks of future abuse and even death.277
Protection orders can ensure the safety not only of the petitioning teen, but also
of other persons vulnerable to retaliation or harassment by including provisions
that prohibit an abuser from contacting the victim, coming near the victim’s
home or school, and contacting or coming near other persons.
Encouraging teens to seek legal protection can result in additional and–more
enduring–benefits than the protection order itself. Although often a useful
tool, a protection order is not a panacea. Teens and adults experiencing
domestic violence are wise to take additional precautions to ensure their safety
when leaving an abusive relationship.278 Moreover, protection orders cannot
help victims heal and move forward from the impact of abuse. Nonetheless,
the protection-order process can serve as a gateway to supportive services.279
This may be especially important for teen petitioners, as they often are

272. See Sousa, supra note 22, at 362 (“[Teens] may also fear that newly won independence
will be taken away.”); WEAVE Focus Groups, supra note 271 (finding that teens were concerned
about retribution by the abuser and about parents exacerbating an already problematic situation).
273. WEAVE Focus Groups, supra note 271.
274. Id. One focus-group participant stated that a parent would be the last person she would
tell about dating violence because she feared that a parent would involve other parents, the police,
or family services organizations. Id.
275. See id.
276. See supra notes 28–35, 42 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., ROEHL ET AL., supra note 25, at 4 (finding that violence generally increases
throughout the relationship and that women attempting to separate from their partners were more
likely to experience renewed violence or even be killed); Glass et al., supra note 25, at 177,
183–85 (identifying risk factors for femicide in adolescent and young adult women).
278. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 354–55 (contending that legal remedies alone are
insufficient to curb dating violence and that teens need access to support services to fully address
the problem).
279. See infra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. Cf. Largio, supra note 62, at 978
(arguing that support services should be available to teen victims in addition to any court-ordered
remedies).
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unaware of the services available to assist them in their communities.280 In
jurisdictions offering a coordinated community response to domestic
violence,281
domestic-violence advocates are more likely to become aware of abused teens
who seek court protection and refer them to community anti-domestic-violence
organizations, which can assist teens in creating safety plans and can provide
counseling and other supportive services to help them heal and achieve
independence from abusive partners.282 Domestic-violence advocates also can
help teens confide in parents about abuse and address any issues that may have
initially discouraged teens from reaching out.
Furthermore, states should grant teens legal capacity to represent themselves
beginning at age twelve because studies indicate that abuse in intimate
relationships begins as early as middle school.283 Establishing twelve as the
minimum age will not open the floodgates to a deluge of claims by middle
school students or minors in general. During 2010, the first full year in which
minors twelve and older had the capacity to seek protection orders in the
District of Columbia, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia saw few
actions brought by minors under age sixteen.284 Of the approximately 7366
total petitions new filings in the Superior Court’s Domestic Violence Unit in
2010, thirty-seven were filed by minors on their own, but only four were filed
by minors under age sixteen, and none were filed by a minor under age
fourteen.285 Setting the age at twelve ensures that the rare middle school
student who faces abuse can obtain the protection she needs.
States should not only grant teens legal capacity explicitly, but also should
do so unconditionally. The conditional grants of legal capacity in Minnesota
and Arizona presumably are intended to ensure that teens’ interests will be
280. See Access, BREAK THE CYCLE, http://www.breakthecycle.org/content/access (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) (noting that teens involved in dating violence may not know where to find
resources).
281. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 28–32 (1999)
(discussing the creation of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia’s Domestic Violence
Unit).
282. Cf. id. at 29–31 (describing how the District of Columbia Domestic Violence Intake
Center provides representatives for women to speak to about obtaining non-legal assistance).
283. See TWEEN AND TEEN DATING VIOLENCE AND ABUSE STUDY, supra note 244, at 10.
One study of tweens ages eleven to fourteen found that twenty percent of tweens in relationships
know friends who are physically abused. Id. Two in five tweens have friends who are victims of
verbal abuse in relationships. Id.
284. See 2010 D.C. Petition Data, supra note 241.
285. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS - STATISTICAL SUMMARY 11 (2010), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts
/docs/DCC2010AnnualReportStatisticalSummary.pdf#page=15 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). Of
the petitions filed by District of Columbia minors in 2010, nine were filed by sixteen-year-olds,
two were filed by fifteen-year-olds, and two were filed by fourteen-year-olds. 2010 D.C. Petition
Data, supra note 241.
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adequately protected if they are permitted to represent themselves.286 Yet,
these threshold determinations make protection orders less accessible to minors
because they risk delaying the proceedings, which may deter minors from
pursuing protection orders altogether. In Minnesota, for example, before a
court can assess the substance of a minor petitioner’s claim for relief, it must
first inquire into the minor’s maturity, judgment, and best interests.287 If the
court denies the minor legal capacity, the court would then need to ensure that
an appropriate adult adequately represented the minor’s interests in the
litigation.288 Because of the potential need to involve an adult representative, it
may reasonably be inferred that this threshold inquiry must take place before
any adjudication of the substance of the minor’s claim. The process of then
identifying and evaluating the fitness of potential adult representatives could
result in additional delay.
Delay could pose a safety risk to abused minors for several reasons. Most
notably, delays in the court proceedings could discourage minors, who may be
hesitant to go to court to begin with, from pursuing their claims for relief.289
Because teens often want and expect near instant gratification from the court
system, many teens have little patience with protracted litigation and may
decide to abandon their claims entirely rather than endure multiple hearings
The expedited nature of
and attendant meetings with counsel.290
protection-order proceedings afforded to adult petitioners makes the
protection-order remedy more appealing to teens than more time-intensive
alternatives.291 Therefore, adding potentially time-consuming layers to the
protection-order process may make the remedy less appealing to teens.
Separately, if an ex parte temporary protection order is in place pending
resolution of the minor’s petition, it may need to be repeatedly extended and
served on the respondent until the capacity issue has been adjudicated.292 In
such circumstances, the minor petitioner may be left without effective legal

286. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
287. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (permitting a minor
who is sixteen or older to petition for a protection order on her own behalf only if the court
determines that, based on various factors, it is appropriate).
288. See id. (requiring representation by a reputable adult if the court determines it is in the
best interests of the minor).
289. See Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 199
(1993) (noting that delays may discourage abused women from seeking protection orders); see
also HERMAN, supra note 270, at 13 (noting that teens are reluctant to participate in the criminal
justice system at all).
290. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 454 (explaining that teens may not seek orders because
they perceive the process as too cumbersome).
291. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 289, at 166 (explaining that civil protection orders
provide a much more efficient remedy compared to proceedings in the criminal justice system).
292. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(7)(a), (c)–(d) (describing the process by which
an ex parte order is granted and served, and the fixed period of effectiveness for such an order).
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protection during periods when a temporary protection order has been
renewed, but not yet served on the respondent.
Moreover, even should the additional time and energy required by the
threshold capacity inquiry not deter teens from pursuing litigation further, the
fear of an invasive or judgmental court inquiry may.293 For these reasons,
protection-order remedies are most accessible when states establish bright-line
rules regarding legal capacity, such as uniformly recognizing capacity
according to age.
Once states encourage teens to come forward, they can ensure that the
interests of teen parties are protected by authorizing courts to appoint attorneys
to represent teens who need assistance in protection-order proceedings.
Attorneys, rather than next friends294 or guardians ad litem,295 are the best
representatives for teens in protection-order proceedings for several reasons.
First, unlike next friends, attorneys are trained to navigate the law and legal

293. See id. § 518B.01(4).
294. See Jarvis v. Crozier, 98 F. 753, 755 (D. W. Va. 1899) (defining “next friend” as an
adult appointed by the court or who is next of kin, who typically has a relationship with the minor
that would naturally incline him or her to protect the minor’s interests); see also H.D.W.,
Annotation, Necessity for and Degree of Relationship to Infant as Affecting Representation as
Next Friend or Guardian Ad Litem, 118 A.L.R. 401, 402 (1939) (describing a next friend or
guardian ad litem as “the nearest relative of the infant not having antagonistic interest in the
matter, and not otherwise disqualified”). In many jurisdictions, common law articulates the
qualifications for serving as a next friend, such as being “truly dedicated to the best interests of
the person” and “hav[ing] some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Whitmore
ex rel. v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990); see also Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273,
275–76 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding that someone could not be classified as a next friend because he
had no close personal relationship with the petitioner).
295. See Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Section of Family Law Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 131, 133 (2003)
[hereinafter ABA Family Law Standards] (explaining that a guardian ad litem can be a parenting
coordinator, evaluator, and advocate, among other things). The term “guardian ad litem” is
widely used to describe two very different roles played by adults representing the interests of
minor parties in civil litigation. See id. Much like a “next friend,” a guardian ad litem may
simply be an adult appointed by the court to represent the interests of an incompetent party to the
legal proceeding. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 161 (2006 & Supp. 2011). In
some jurisdictions, adults appointed to represent minor plaintiffs are called next friends, and
adults appointed to represent minor defendants are called guardians ad litem. See Gardner ex rel.
Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 137 n.10 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Dye v. Fremont Cnty. Sch.
Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 985 (Wyo. 1991). By contrast, a guardian ad litem may also be an
attorney appointed by the court to represent a minor’s interests in a proceeding, even if the minor
is not a party, such as in a custody or an abuse and neglect case. See 53 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney as
Guardian Ad Litem § 165 (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also ABA Family Law Standards, supra, at
132–33 (stating that an attorney may be appointed to act in a child’s best interests in custody and
visitation determinations, among other types of cases). Unlike attorneys for adults or attorneys
representing minors in other capacities, guardians ad litem are typically charged with representing
“a child’s best interest” as the guardian ad litem perceives them, not the minor’s expressed
interests—though the expressed interests should be considered. See ABA Family Law Standards,
supra, at 150–51.
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proceedings.296 More importantly, attorneys are bound by ethical duties to
understand and zealously advocate their client’s interests and to keep all
information related to a client confidential.297 By contrast, next friends are
regulated only by their own moral compasses and court efforts to ensure that
they have no conflicts of interest with the minor parties they represent.298
Although guardians ad litem may also be bound by ethical obligations and,
therefore, may offer teens more protection than next friends,299 the guardian
need not abide by the minor’s expressed wishes when determining the minor’s
best interests.300 Certainly, guardians ad litem play an important role in many
cases that significantly impact minors’ lives but in which minors’ voices would
not otherwise be heard, such as child custody and abuse and neglect matters.301
This role is less effective, however, in cases involving teens and cases brought
by teens themselves to vindicate their own interests. For several reasons
including their ages, the experiences at issue, and the limited nature of the
remedy teen petitioners are seeking in protection-order cases, teens themselves
are in the best position to understand what will best serve their interests.302
Granting teens who have experienced abuse the authority to determine and
advocate their own interests can have the added benefit of helping to restore
some of the self-confidence and autonomy that an abusive partner crushed.303
Perhaps most importantly for teens, attorneys do not need a prior
relationship to teen clients outside of court proceedings. In many jurisdictions,
to serve as a “next friend,” an adult must have a close relationship with a minor

296. See Davis, 492 F. Supp. at 275 (indicating only that a next friend must have a close
relationship with a party and not requiring any legal knowledge).
297. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.6 (2010).
298. H.D.W., supra note 294, at 402 (stating only that a next friend must be a close relative
of the minor and not have “an antagonistic interest in the matter”).
299. ABA Family Law Standards, supra note 295, at 147. Compare Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics
Comm., Formal Opinion No. 85-4 (1985) (concluding that the traditional duty of confidentiality
does not apply when an attorney is appointed to serve as a child’s guardian ad litem, but that
confidentiality should still be exercised in accordance with the child’s best interests), with
Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that a communication
between a minor child and a guardian ad litem in a divorce and custody case is protected by the
attorney-client privilege).
300. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE
NEGLECT
CASES
A-2,
B-5
(1996),
available
at
AND
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/standards_abuseneglect.aut
hcheckdam.pdf.
301. See Nancy Neraas, The Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings: The King County, Washington, Experience, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 856 (1983)
(stating that abused and neglected children need advocates to advance their interests).
302. See Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s Misperceptions of
Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1705 (1996) (“Those advocating the guardian
ad litem role for most children generally still concede that at some age—at least in the late
teenage years—children should be able to direct their counsel, on some, if not all issues.”).
303. Smith, supra note 50, at 120; Stoever, supra note 69, at 307.
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unrelated to the pending legal action.304 Such relationship requirements are
meant to ensure that next friends will be motivated by their care and loyalty to
vindicate the minors’ interests.305 In the context of teen dating abuse, however,
those who would qualify as next friends are the same people to whom teens are
resistant to disclose abuse. This problem is less attenuated in jurisdictions that
permit any adult, not just those with special relationships, to represent a teen’s
interests in protection-order proceedings.306 Nonetheless, this openness brings
its own challenges, as a teen is then tasked with identifying a trusted adult who
is willing to help.307
To avoid the delay to protection-order proceedings that could result from
courts engaging in a case-by-case inquiry regarding whether attorney
appointment is warranted, states should institute bright-line standards
mandating attorney appointment for younger teens, who are more likely to
need assistance, and making attorney appointment discretionary for older
teens. Two characteristics of teen protection-order cases suggest that legal
services organizations and pro bono appointments will satisfy the demand for
attorneys in such cases. First, as the experience of the District of Columbia
illustrates, teens are not likely to come forward in large numbers, even if they
are accorded legal capacity.308 The small number of cases involving minors in
the District of Columbia has enabled legal services attorneys who are experts
in domestic violence law to fully meet the demand for services and also
represent minor petitioners who choose, but are not required, to have
representation. Second, even if legal services organizations are unable to meet
the demand for teen representation, courts may be able to fill the remaining
gap by recruiting attorneys for pro bono appointment. Civil protection-order
cases are appealing pro bono matters for attorneys because they typically entail
a limited and relatively predictable time commitment. A critical feature of the
protection-order remedy is its expediency.309 To enable protection-order
claims to be resolved on an expedited basis, courts may restrict the scope and
304. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990) (suggesting that a next friend
“must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest” (citing Davis v. Austin,
492 F. Supp. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Ga. 1980))); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 604–05 (4th Cir.
2002) (dismissing a public defender’s request to act as the defendant’s next friend because the
two parties has no close, preexisting relationship, as required by case law in multiple federal
circuits), vacated on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Davis, 492 F. Supp. at 276 (denying the
first cousin of a prisoner “next friend” standing because they were not in frequent contact).
305. See Jarvis v. Crozier, 98 F. 753, 755 (D. W. Va. 1899) (stating that next friend should be
“next of kin, and so nearly related to [the minors] that the court would recognize the right to act
for them”).
306. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 454.
307. See id. (noting that it may be difficult for teens ashamed of the abuse or isolated from
friends and family to find an adult who will file on their behalf).
308. See supra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
309. See Kinports & Fisher, supra note 289, at 165–66 (describing the typical two-step
process for obtaining emergency and “permanent” protection orders and noting the key
advantages of providing expeditious protection).
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extent of discovery and schedule final hearings within a few weeks after the
filing of a petition.310 The resulting short duration of protection-order cases
may be attractive to prospective pro bono attorneys in comparison to the more
extensive time commitment required by other cases available for pro bono
representation.311
In addition to encouraging teens to come forward and seek legal protection,
granting teens the legal capacity to seek protection orders on their own
advances state public policies that authorize minors to make their own
decisions when their health, well-being, or safety is at issue.312 Restrictions on
minors’ legal capacity were developed to protect minors’ interests.313 In
certain areas, however, states have begun to recognize that restricting minors’
legal capacity can harm their interests because the participation of an adult
representative deters minors from seeking the assistance they need to protect
themselves.314
For example, many states authorize minors to independently consent to:
emergency and outpatient medical care; testing and treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases; substance-abuse treatment; outpatient mental-health
services; and reproductive healthcare.315 States have also accorded minors the
legal capacity to make important decisions about the health, well-being, and
310. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 1054 (“Civil protection order discovery provisions
should be formulated in light of the summary nature of civil protection order proceedings and the
need to avoid delays in the issuance of a protection order.”); see, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. SCR.-DV
R. 8 (making discovery available only “[f]or good cause shown” and restricting the forms of
permissible discovery where the standard is met).
311. Given the complexities of representing minor parties, if states elect to appoint pro bono
attorneys to represent minor parties, they should ensure that the attorneys receive proper training
before their appointments.
312. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 46, at 895 (detailing the passage of mature-minor
statutes in recent years and noting that “[a]ll of these statutes have converged on the idea that
there are certain areas where minors need protection from harm. In these areas, minors are
granted the rights to make important decisions without notifying their parents”).
313. See Jeruss, supra note 261, at 862 (indicating that courts require parental involvement in
minors’ legal matters to protect minors).
314. See Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My Mom! A Minor’s Right to Informational
Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 444 (2011) (observing that in the context of healthcare, teens are
deterred from seeking treatment for sexually transmitted infections by fear of disclosure, leading
states to eliminate parental-consent requirements for such treatment); Susan D. Hawkins, Note,
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment
Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2123 (1996) (explaining that mature-minor medical
statutes encourage minors to seek medical care that they would not if parental consent were
needed).
315. See Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health
Care, 4 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2000, at 4–5 (detailing the healthcare context
as an area in which states have expanded the capacity of minors); see also Rhonda Gay Hartman,
Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U.
CHI. J. INTERDISC. LEGAL STUD. 87, 92–93 (2001) (discussing how state legislatures have
lowered or eliminated the age at which teens may consent to treatment in an effort to encourage
teens to access mental-health services).
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safety of their own children without adult involvement.316 To this end, in some
states minors may consent to the placement of their child for adoption,317
pursue legal claims for child support318 and custody,319 and apply for
government benefits, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) and Medicaid.320
In each of these circumstances, states set aside traditional restrictions on
minors’ legal capacity to encourage minors to take advantage of services and
remedies important to their health, safety, and well-being. According abused
teens legal capacity in protection-order cases would serve the same purpose.
Granting teens the autonomy to act in their own interests is especially
important in the protection-order context because teens attempting to separate
from abusive relationships are often at risk of serious injury or death.321
Moreover, because teens who have experienced abuse have often had their
self-esteem and self-confidence crushed, having the opportunity to vindicate
their own interests in protection-order proceedings may help empower teens to
reassert control over their lives outside of the courthouse.322
It is possible, but unlikely, that teens may abuse their capacity to seek
protective orders, as improper claims are occasionally asserted even by adult
petitioners.323 Indeed, parents themselves may be tempted to seek protection
orders on behalf of their children for improper purposes, such as intervening in
a disfavored, though not abusive, relationship.324 It is precisely the
316. See Minors’ Rights as Parents, ST. POL’YS IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York,
N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2011, at 2 (providing that thirty states allow minors to make medical decisions for
their child).
317. See id.; see also An Overview of Minor’s Consent Law, ST. POL’YS IN BRIEF
(Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2011, at 1 (detailing that as of September 2011,
twenty-eight states explicitly allow minors to consent to the adoption of their child and twelve
states implicitly permit it by not distinguishing between minor and adult parents).
318. KRAMER, supra note 74, § 14:2, at 980–87.
319. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-914(a-3)(1) (Supp. 2011) (granting minor parents the right to
initiate custody proceedings).
320. See JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & JOHN JUTCHINS, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ISSUE
BRIEF: TEENS AND TANF: HOW ADOLESCENTS FARE UNDER THE NATION’S WELFARE
PROGRAM 1–2 (2003) (noting that teen parents are permitted to receive TANF aid, provided that
they live with a parent or guardian and attend school or a training program).
321. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
323. See Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Family Lawyers: The Need for an
Identification Protocol, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1027, 1059 (1995) (stating that false battery claims in
domestic-violence situations, although rare, do exist).
324. See, e.g., Claver v. Wilbur, 280 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing a
civil protection order that a mother obtained on behalf of her sixteen-year-old daughter against
the daughter’s boyfriend because “[t]he mere fact that S.W.’s parents do not like appellant was
not a proper ground upon which to issue an order of protection in the absence of evidence of
actual physical harm or the fear of imminent physical harm”); see also Acevedo v. Williams, 985
So. 2d 669, 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (vacating a protection order that a mother
obtained on behalf of her daughter against the daughter’s boyfriend based solely on mother’s
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responsibility of judges, however to determine which claims merit relief.325
Moreover, advocates can counsel teens whose claims are denied about more
appropriate recourses and refer them to supportive services. Whatever their
motives, providing teens access to civil protection orders creates a rare
opportunity for the community to identify and connect with troubled teens
facing serious issues.
In short, although it is understandable that parents want to take part in
protection-order proceedings, requiring that teens involve parents as a
prerequisite to court protection may put teens’ lives at risk by deterring or
precluding teens from seeking legal protection altogether.326 As states have
concluded in other contexts, enabling teens to take independent action in
protection-order cases will encourage teens to come forward and seek
protection and better protect teens’ safety and well-being in the long term.327
2. Parent Notification
To more effectively encourage abused teens to seek legal protection, access
to protection orders should not be conditioned on parent notification. The
legislative histories of the parent-notification provisions in the California and
Tennessee protective-order laws do not offer any insight into the intent behind
the provisions.328 In the District of Columbia, supporters of parent notification
argued that a parent should be notified when his or her child files a petition for
a protection order because notification enables parents to protect the safety of
the parent and other children in the household, to help enforce any protection
order obtained by the child, and to preserve the sanctity of the family.329
Despite objections raised by numerous domestic-violence experts, the District
of Columbia enacted a parent-notification requirement.330
allegations of sexual contact, given that the sexual contact was consensual and lawful and there
were no allegations of abuse); Anderson v. McGuffey ex rel. McGuffey, 746 So. 2d 1257, 1258
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (vacating a protection order that a father obtained on behalf of his
daughter against the daughter’s boyfriend based solely on the father’s beliefs that the respondent
was a bad influence and that keeping the respondent away from his daughter was in her best
interest).
325. See Brustin, supra note 16, at 352 (noting that granting teens capacity to represent their
own interests in protection-order proceedings does not amount to a grant of unchecked autonomy
because “judges must review and sign protection orders before they are issued”).
326. See Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra note 28, at 22 (testimony of
Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services of WEAVE); see also id. at 3 (testimony of Judith
Sandalow, Executive Director, The Children’s Law Center) (emphasizing that the teens who need
the most help are the most likely to be deterred by requiring parental involvement).
327. See supra notes 312–20.
328. See S.B. Analysis, Assem. B. 2155, Reg. Sess., at 1–3 (Cal. 1996); Assem. B. Analysis,
B. 2155, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 1996).
329. See Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra 28, at 3–4 (statement of
Patricia A. Riley, Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney).
330. See D.C. CODE § 16-1004(e) (Supp. 2011) (“If a minor has filed a petition for civil
protection without a parent, guardian, or custodian, the court shall send a copy of any order issued
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Statutes that grant minors the capacity to seek protection orders on their
own, but also direct courts to notify a parent when a minor has taken this step,
are self-defeating. Teens who are reluctant to involve a parent in a
protection-order case at the outset are likely to be deterred from initiating a
case if the court subsequently will notify a parent about the litigation. For this
reason, parent-notification provisions alienate the same teens that statutes
granting minors standing and capacity are intended to protect.
California and the District of Columbia grant courts the discretion to waive
parent notification if doing so serves a minor’s best interests.331 Although the
waiver provision is helpful, it only slightly diminishes the potential harm.
Neither the protection-order statutes nor the common law in California or the
District of the Columbia provide any guidance regarding what factors a court
should consider when assessing whether parent notification serves a minor’s
best interests.332 As a result, whether parent notification will be waived is
unpredictable, as it is a case-by-case determination subject to the presiding
judge’s discretion. This unpredictability makes seeking a protection order a
risky proposition for teens who are adamantly opposed to informing their
parents about their decision to seek legal protection,333 even if such teens can
offer persuasive reasons in support of a waiver.
In practice, the “best interests” test is superfluous. The act of seeking legal
protection itself demonstrates a minor’s maturity and sound judgment and also
likely indicates a need for intervention, as the intensity and frequency of abuse
in her relationship are likely increasing.334 If enhancing teens’ safety by
encouraging them to obtain legal protection from abuse is the goal of
permitting minors to seek protection orders independently, then, as a policy
matter, it generally will be in an abused minor’s best interest to actually be
protected by such an order. If a parent-notification mandate will cause a minor
to choose to dismiss her petition, then it will be in a minor’s best interest to
waive the parent-notification requirement.
In Tennessee, minors must obtain the signature of a parent to file a petition
for a protection order, unless they obtain the signature of a caseworker from a

. . . and notice of the hearing to that parent, guardian, or custodian, unless, in the discretion of the
court, notification of that parent, guardian, or custodian would be contrary to the best interests of
the minor.”).
331. Id.; See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
332. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(2); D.C. CODE § 16-1004(e). The author’s
research has revealed no cases in California or the District of Columbia in which a court analyzed
whether notifying a parent that a minor is seeking a protection order is in the minor’s best
interest. Lacking any sources squarely on point, courts and counsel might consult the
jurisprudence regarding waivers of parent-notification requirements in the abortion context, as the
inquiry necessitates similar analyses of a minor’s character and life circumstances. See infra Part
V.D.
333. See supra notes 21–34, 271–75 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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family violence prevention organization.335 Although better than offering no
alternative to mandated parent involvement, the inclusion of the caseworker
option only nominally improves the statute. Minors who are unaware of this
option, who are unsure of how to contact such an organization, or who are
wary of approaching an unknown organization will not benefit from the
provision. Furthermore, the Tennessee statute requires the court to notify a
parent when a minor files a petition that is signed by a caseworker, unless
notification would “create a threat of serious harm to the minor.”336 This
parent-notification requirement undermines the benefit of the caseworker
alternative, which aims to make protection orders available to minors who are
unable or unwilling to involve their parents.337 These same minors are likely
to be deterred from filing a petition when the court is likely to notify a parent
of its filing.
V. THE PERILS FOR TEENS IN AMBIGUOUS PROTECTION-ORDER STATUTES
Today, state protection-order statutes are frequently ambiguous or silent
regarding the extent to which minor victims are accorded standing and capacity
to seek protection orders.338 In practice, ambiguities in protection-order
statutes tend to be resolved in favor of excluding minors from seeking
protection orders and mandating adult involvement in cases brought by minors,
as opposed to permitting minors to proceed alone.339 As a result, minors
choose not to access the legal system for protection, which leaves abused
minors in jeopardy.340 To ensure that victims of any age can assert claims for
protection, states must extend standing and capacity to minors explicitly.
A. Ambiguity Equals Exclusion
Protection-order statutes with ambiguous standing and capacity requirements
directly and indirectly deny teens access to justice. Ambiguity directly results
in the exclusion of teens from the protection-order remedy because in practice,
ambiguities regarding teens’ rights to standing and capacity typically are
construed to circumscribe those rights.341 When teens’ rights are not clearly
articulated, adult protectionist instincts and perceptions of the legal system as
an inappropriate forum for resolving teen problems operate to exclude teens
from accessing justice.
335. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2010).
336. Id.
337. See WEAVE Focus Groups, supra note 271 (illustrating how teens are reluctant to tell
their parents about abuse for fear that parents may not adequately assist them).
338. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3.b.
339. See infra Part V.A.
340. See Suarez, supra note 23, at 549 (noting how parent notification discourages teens from
taking advantage of the legal system).
341. Cf. Largio, supra note 62, at 969 (describing the ways in which definitions of “dating
relationship” in protection-order statutes have been interpreted to disqualify teen relationships).

2012]

Securing Access to Justice for Teens

509

For example, before March 2009 the District of Columbia’s protection-order
statute, the Intrafamily Offenses Act, was entirely ambiguous as to whether
and under what circumstances abused minors had standing to seek protection
orders, and concomitantly, whether and to what extent minors had the capacity
to represent themselves in related court proceedings.342 In fact, the statute
made no mention of minors or of age in any of its provisions.343 During this
time, the lack of specificity in the statute often prevented teens from obtaining
protection.344 Whether teens were determined to have standing and capacity to
pursue protection orders turned on which court officers considered their claims
and whether they had counsel.345 Teens who sought to file petitions for
protection orders without a parent or counsel present were often turned away
from the courthouse.346
In January 2009, the D.C. Council enacted the Intrafamily Offenses Act of
2008, which, among many other things, explicitly accorded teens standing to
file petitions for civil protection orders on their own and the capacity to
represent themselves in related court proceedings to varying extents depending
on their ages and their relationships to the respondents.347 The clarity in the
new provisions has enhanced access to justice for abused teens.348 Minors no
longer must struggle to access relief from the court; the court routinely permits
minors to file petitions on their own and works with advocates to address any
procedural issues.349
The stark contrast in teens’ experiences seeking protection orders in the
District of Columbia under the current and former versions of the Intrafamily
Offenses Act provides an important case study. The experience of District of
Columbia teens demonstrates that when protections are not explicitly extended
to teens, courts start from “no,”350 and tend to resolve statutory ambiguities in
favor of denying teens access to the protection-order remedy if they are not

342. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001(1), (5) (2001); see also Hearing on the Intrafamily
Offenses Act of 2007, supra note 28, at 6–9 (testimony of Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal
Services for WEAVE) (detailing the significant uncertainty in the District of Columbia’s
domestic-violence statute with regard to teens’ ability to file for protective orders on their own).
343. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001(1), (5).
344. Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra note 28, at 8 (testimony of
Karen Cunningham, Directory of Legal Services for WEAVE).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008, 56 D.C. Reg. 1338, 1340–41 (Feb. 13, 2009)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the D.C. Code).
348. See Interview with Elisabeth Olds, Co-Exec. Dir. of Survivors & Advocates for
Empowerment, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 25, 2010) (explaining that the enactment of the
Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008 has ensured that teens are able to initiate claims for protection
orders when they seek help from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia).
349. Id.
350. Id.
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accompanied by a parent or another adult.351 By contrast, when statutes
explicitly articulate the protections accorded to teens, courts start from “yes,”
and assume that unaccompanied teens have the right to access protection
orders, ensuring that their claims proceed.352
Ambiguity with regard to standing and capacity indirectly encourages the
exclusion of teens from the protection-order remedy because it fosters
unpredictability for parties and attorneys.353 Because most trial-court opinions
in civil protection-order cases are not written and few cases are appealed, very
few published opinions exist that analyze these ambiguities to guide judicial
decision making and help attorneys and parties predict how courts will
interpret protection-order statutes.354 Where the availability of protection
orders for teens is unpredictable, advocates and lawyers may be reluctant to
encourage teens to seek court protection for fear that they will be denied access
to the remedy, which will further disempower and alienate them.355 Teen
petitioners may be reluctant to invest time and effort into initiating
protection-order cases without a guarantee that they will be able to proceed.356
Other teen victims also may be deterred from seeking protection orders if they
hear about their peers being turned away from the courthouse.357 Thus, the
absence of clear legal standards indirectly makes protection orders less
accessible to teens. For these reasons, to best protect teens, protection-order
statutes should not only extend standing and capacity to teens, but they should
do so explicitly.
B. Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Interpreted to Accord Standing to Minors
Several legal principles support extending standing to minor victims to seek
protection orders where statutes are ambiguous or silent on the issue. First, as
a general matter, a petitioner’s age is not essential to the establishment of

351. See id. (noting that the default response of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia under the prior version of the Intrafamily Offenses Act was to require adult
involvement in cases initiated by teens).
352. Id.
353. See Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra note 28, at 8 (testimony of
Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services for WEAVE) (commenting on the consequences
of the District of Columbia’s (formerly) ambiguous statute).
354. See id. (“Some judges permit minors to file for a CPO on their own behalf, others
demand that an adult file on behalf of the minor, and others still make decisions on a case-by-case
basis, considering the maturity of the partners and the severity of the abuse.”).
355. Id. at 9 (commenting that if a teen’s first attempt to seek protection is rejected, she will
likely not seek legal remedies for protection again).
356. See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
357. See Hearing on the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007, supra note 28, at 9 (testimony of
Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services for WEAVE) (“If the word on the street is that
the . . . legal system will not help teens, teens may be deterred entirely from seeking civil
protection orders . . . .”).
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standing.358 Although the age of majority impacts a party’s legal capacity to
pursue litigation independently, it does not necessarily negate the party’s right
to assert a claim for legal relief.359 Absent a statute or constitutional provision
to the contrary, “[c]hildren enjoy the same right to protection and legal redress
for wrongs done [to] them” as adults.360 Indeed, some states have determined
that “only the strongest reasons, grounded in public policy, can justify
limitation or abolition of [children’s] rights.”361 This view accords with
constitutional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has made clear that
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,

358. Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1180 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
359. See id. at 1180–81 (indicating that a child can have standing to sue despite her age, yet
lack capacity to do so, thus requiring a representative to bring the suit on her behalf); see also
supra text accompanying note 84.
360. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass. 1975); see also Petersen v. City
& Cnty. of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969) (“[I]n general, minor children are entitled
to the same redress for wrongs done them as are any other persons.” (citing Dunlap v. Dunlap,
150 A. 905, 906 (N.H. 1930))); Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790–91 (Ill. 1978)
(“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless clearly debarred from so
doing by some statute or constitutional provision.” (citing Walgreen Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 153
N.E. 831, 833 (Ill. 1926))); Norris v. Mingle, 29 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind. 1940) (“[A] minor should
not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless the same are clearly barred on account of some
statutory or constitutional provision.”); Gillette v. Del. L. & W.R. Co., 102 A. 673, 673 (N.J.
1917) (holding that an infant’s minority does not prevent him from initiating suit to redress legal
claims); Henry ex. rel. Henry v. City of N.Y., 724 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1999) (“[A]n infant’s
right of action ‘at its origination is and remains in the infant . . . . Infancy does not incapacitate
the infant from bringing the action.’” (quoting Murphy v. Vill. of Fort Edward, 107 N.E. 716, 717
(N.Y. 1915))); Harrison v. Wallton’s Ex’r, 30 S.E. 372, 373 (Va. 1898) (holding that minors can
bring suit through adult representatives to enforce their rights during their minority); Hunter v. N.
Mason High Sch., 529 P.2d 898, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“The legal disabilities of minors
have been firmly established by common law and statute. They were established for the
protection of minors, and not as a bar to the enforcement of their rights.” (citing 43 C.J.S. Infants
§ 19 (1945))), aff’d, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (W. Va.
1976) (“We perceive no reason why minor children should not enjoy the same right to legal
redress for wrongs done to them as others enjoy.”). Courts themselves often confuse the issues of
standing and capacity, but even in such instances they regularly hold that minors have the right to
seek legal relief in the courts for wrongs done to them (that is, minors have standing to assert
legal claims), but only through appropriate adult representatives (that is, minors lack legal
capacity to pursue litigation on their own). See, e.g., In re Morehead, 706 P.2d 480, 481 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1985) (“[M]inors generally have the capacity to sue and to be sued. However, the action
must be brought in the name of the child by a next friend or guardian.” (internal citations
omitted)); Day v. MacDonald, 586 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “a
minor has no standing to sue before he or she reaches the age of majority and, therefore, a minor
must sue by a guardian or other like fiduciary or by a next friend”).
361. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d at 912 (citing Peterson, 462 P.2d at 1009); see also Norris, 29
N.E.2d at 402 (“It has always been the policy of the law in this state that the courts should
carefully guard the rights of minors.”); Hunter, 529 P.2d at 899 (“[I]t would be fundamentally
unfair for a minor to be denied his recourse to the courts because of circumstances which are both
legally and practically beyond his control.”).
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are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”362
Although the Constitution does not mention children, a series of Supreme
Court decisions has established that minors are “persons” under the Bill of
Rights and are entitled to have their rights protected against state interference
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.363 In reaching
these decisions, the Supreme Court implies that minors have standing to seek
legal relief when their constitutional rights are violated, because without
standing to seek redress for deprivations of rights, minors’ rights would have
symbolic value but no practical effect.364 To be sure, minors’ constitutional
rights are not coextensive with adults’; the Supreme Court has made clear that
states may impose greater burdens on minors’ exercise of constitutional rights
if doing so serves a state interest not otherwise applicable to adults.365
362. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
363. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding that the Eighth and
Fourteen Amendments prohibited the execution of a person who was a minor at the time of his
offense); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (holding that minors are entitled to the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, including at
school); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (holding that minors are
entitled to the right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
including the right to purchase contraceptives); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy, which applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects minors); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)
(holding that minors have a right to procedural due process in school disciplinary proceedings,
including being provided with reasonable notice of the charges against them and an opportunity
to respond); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (holding that minors’ rights to procedural
due process require that they be adjudicated in juvenile delinquency proceedings by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines Indept. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(holding that minors enjoy the right to free speech accorded by the First Amendment); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968) (holding that minors have the right to equal protection
under the law and that a law permitting “legitimate,” but not “illegitimate,” children to seek
compensation for the wrongful death of their mothers lacked a rational basis); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30–31, 41, 55, 57 (1967) (holding that minors have a right to procedural due process and
fair treatment in juvenile delinquency proceedings, which requires, among other things, that
minors are given adequate notice of the charges against them, appointed counsel if they cannot
afford to retain an attorney, accorded the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and are
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). See generally Clark,
supra note 211 (collecting and summarizing constitutional cases involving children’s rights).
364. See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text.
365. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–42 (holding that schools must only show that a search
of a minor’s property is reasonable under the circumstances to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a
less exacting requirement than the probable-cause standard required for searches of adults);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640, 643–44 (1979) (holding that states may require parent
notification or consent for minors seeking abortions if the state creates a mechanism for mature
minors, or minors who can demonstrate that parental involvement would contravene their best
interests, to bypass the requirement); McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971)
(holding that minors’ rights to procedural due process, unlike adults’, do not require states to
accord minors the right to demand a jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (finding a statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials
to minors to be constitutional).
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Nonetheless, the Constitution’s baseline assumption is that minors, like adults,
have rights warranting legal protection.366
Moreover, constitutional provisions and statutes in several states explicitly
guarantee to minors a general right to access the courts for redress of
grievances.367 South Dakota, for example, dictates that “[a] minor may enforce
his rights by civil action, or other legal proceedings, in the same manner as a
person of full age.”368 Even where minors’ right to access the courts is not
explicitly codified, by establishing the procedures to be followed when courts
are presented with claims by minor parties who lack legal capacity to sue,
court rules in many states manifest a presumption that individuals of any age
are entitled to pursue legal claims.369 For all of these reasons, teens should be
presumed to have the same rights to standing to seek protection orders as
adults, unless the legislature explicitly has denied teens standing in the
governing statute.
Furthermore, court interpretations of protection-order statutes support
conferring standing on teens when the law does not explicitly prohibit doing
so. In numerous jurisdictions, it is well-settled that because the of the remedial
nature of statutes creating protection orders, the statutes should be liberally
construed to benefit the class of individuals the statutes were created to
protect—victims of domestic violence.370 In a practical sense, this principle of

366. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
367. See Jeruss, supra note 261, at 904 tbl.1 (including an appendix compiling state
constitutional provisions and statutes according minors a right of access to the courts).
368. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-1-3 (2004).
369. See Jeruss, supra note 261, at 904 tbl.1 (including states that find a minor’s right of
access to courts through case law, rather than through statute); cf. Alison M. Brumley, Comment,
Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 356 (1991)
(“Congress designed [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 17(c) to promote and protect the
ability of minor plaintiffs and defendants to pursue their legal interests with such guidance as the
trial court deems necessary in the best interests of the minor. The rule reflects a belief that minors
as well as adults should have access to the courts to protect their legal rights.”).
370. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-101(b) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011) (“This
article shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the following purposes: (1) To assure
victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that the law can provide.”);
Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991) (“The Intrafamily Offenses Act . . . was
designed to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence. . . . ‘The paramount
consideration concerning this legislation is that it is remedial,’ and the Act must be liberally
construed in furtherance of its remedial purpose.” (quoting United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d
1209, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1972))); Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98–99 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009) (“‘As a remedial statute, the Domestic Abuse Act receives liberal construction in favor of
the injured party.’” (quoting Swensen v. Swensen, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)));
Frisk v. Frisk, 719 N.W.2d 332, 335 (N.D. 2006) (noting that the state’s protection-order statute
is a remedial statute that the court construes “‘liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to
promoting justice’” (quoting Gaab v. Ochsner, 636 N.W.2d 669, 671 (N.D. 1980))); Raynes v.
Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Vt. 2008) (stating that, as a remedial statute, Vermont’s Abuse
Prevention Act “must be liberally construed to ‘suppress the evil and advance the remedy
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liberal construction means that when courts are faced with a choice between
alternate interpretations of protection-order statutes, courts should select
interpretations that provide the greatest protections for victims of domestic
violence. From this perspective, ambiguous statutes regarding minors’ right to
standing to pursue the protection-order remedy should be interpreted to extend
standing to minors.
The West Virginia Supreme Court relied, in part, on the principle of liberal
construction in support of its holding that West Virginia’s protection-order
statute accords standing to minor victims of domestic violence.371 The West
Virginia protection-order statute included children and stepchildren within the
list of qualifying relationships372 and provided that any “person” seeking relief
for himself or herself could file a petition for a protective order,373 but did not
specify whether minors had standing as “persons” to seek protection.374 In
Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, the court affirmed the issuance of a protection order
sought by a fifteen-year-old against his mother.375 In support of its conclusion
that the legislature intended to protect all victims of domestic violence, minors
and adults, the court cited the statute’s findings and purposes section, which
provided, in part: “(b) This article shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote the following purposes: (1) To assure victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection from abuse that the law can provide.”376
Finally, public policy supports extending standing to all individuals,
regardless of age, when the law is silent to instill confidence in the legal
system. As recognized by Michigan’s Court of Appeals:
Courts must stand prepared to protect the rights of all citizens,
including teenagers. Denying a teen-aged litigant access to our
courts simply because he happens to be a minor not only tends to
lessen the confidence of young people in our legal system but adds
credence to the existence of the ‘generation gap.’ And it may even
help widen that gap.377
This is especially true in the case of abused minors coming forward to seek
assistance from the legal system. Teens may be especially reticent to seek
intended by the Legislature’” (quoting Dep’t of Corr. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 917 A.2d 451,
454 (Vt. 2006))).
371. See Katherine B.T. V. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 576 (W. Va. 2006) (concluding that the
state legislature intended for the protection-order statute to extend to all domestic-violence
victims, regardless of age).
372. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-204(7)(4) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011).
373. See id. § 48-27-305 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011); see also id. § 48-27-304(b)
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011) (“No person shall be refused the right to file a petition under the
provisions of this article. No person shall be denied relief under the provisions of this article if
she or he presents facts sufficient under the provisions of this article for the relief sought.”).
374. See Katherine B.T., 640 S.E.2d at 575–76.
375. Id. at 571–72.
376. Id. at 576 (citing W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101 (2001)).
377. Buckholz v. Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
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assistance from the legal system because they feel intimidated by or lack
experience with the legal system, have had negative personal experiences with
law enforcement or the courts, or perceive the legal system to be racist,
ineffective, or otherwise out of touch with their community.378 Teens who are
turned away when they reach out to the courts for help are unlikely to seek
court assistance again, and may be further discouraged from pursuing other
avenues of relief.379 Conversely, according minors standing to seek protection
orders fosters their confidence in the legal system and increases the likelihood
that minors will turn to the legal system for help in the future.
In addition to West Virginia, the highest courts in at least two other states
have interpreted protection-order statutes that are silent on the issue to accord
standing to minors.380 The Supreme Court of South Dakota interpreted the
state’s protection-order statute to grant minors standing coextensive with that
accorded to adults,381 and, in D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court of Iowa interpreted the Iowa statute to accord minors standing to seek
protection orders against cohabitants and spouses.382
Unfortunately, the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies the need for
precision in legislative drafting on matters of standing.
The Iowa
protection-order statute defines “[f]amily or household members” as “spouses,
persons cohabiting, parents, or other persons related by consanguinity or
affinity,” but “does not include children under age eighteen” of such
persons.383 In doing so, the statute appears to explicitly preclude the issuance
of protection orders between parents and children, and children and their adult
relatives.384 Yet, the statute seems to contemplate that protection orders will
be issued to protect minors in some circumstances because it permits “[a]
person, including a parent or guardian on behalf of an unemancipated minor,
[to] seek relief from domestic abuse by filing a verified petition.”385
Furthermore, because all minors are under the age of eighteen,386 it is unclear
under what circumstances the statute permits the issuance of protection orders
to benefit or restrain minor parties.
The Supreme Court of Iowa resolved this question by interpreting the statute
to “afford[] a right of action against domestic abuse to married persons under
378. See WEAVE Focus Groups, supra note 271.
379. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text.
380. See D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1998); Beermann v.
Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 869–70, 874 (S.D. 1997).
381. See Beermann, 559 N.W.2d at 874.
382. 577 N.W.2d at 646.
383. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(4)(a)–(b) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
384. See D.M.H., 577 N.W.2d at 646 (noting how the Iowa statute excludes minor children of
“family or household members” from the definition of domestic abuse).
385. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
386. See id. § 599.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011) (noting that the age of minority extends to
age eighteen).
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age eighteen and children under eighteen who are cohabitating.”387 The court
explicitly held that the statute precluded only actions brought by children who
witnessed abuse committed by or experienced by a family or household
member parent, but implicitly also held that the statute precluded actions by
children abused by family or household members,388 a conclusion that the Iowa
Court of Appeals later reached in another case.389
Although the D.M.H. decision provides some guidance regarding the extent
of minors’ standing to seek relief under the statute, the opinion leaves many
questions unanswered. Under the court’s reasoning, by virtue of sharing
marital or cohabitant relationships, minors are viewed as persons of their own
accord, and not solely as the children of others.390 The court does not explain,
however, why its reasoning would not also extend a right of action to children
who fall within the other relationship categories within family or household
membership, such as children who are themselves parents and abused by
co-parents, or who are abused by child relatives. Furthermore, because the
opinion says nothing about minors’ standing to seek protection orders in the
context of other relationships covered by the statute apart from family or
household membership, it does not elucidate whether the lack of an age
requirement in those provisions includes or excludes minors from their
protections.
Like Iowa’s, statutes that explicitly confer standing on adults to seek
protection orders on behalf of minors, but remain ambiguous with regard to the
rights to standing enjoyed by minors themselves, should be interpreted to
extend standing to minors. An adult representative cannot attempt to vindicate
a right on a minor’s behalf if the law does not accord such a right to a minor
herself.391 Washington’s Supreme Court affirmed this principle when it held
that the same standing restrictions that (formerly) prevented a minor under
sixteen years of age from seeking a protection order against a dating partner on
her own behalf also denied a parent standing to seek a protection order against
a dating partner on behalf of a minor child under the age of sixteen.392
Conversely, a grant of standing to an adult to vindicate a minor’s rights

387. D.M.H., 577 N.W.2d at 646.
388. Id.
389. P.M. v. R.H., No. 03–2059, 2004 WL 1899919, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004).
390. D.M.H., 577 N.W.2d at 646 (noting how minors who are married or are cohabiting with
another are entitled to protection, but that children of family or household members are
excluded).
391. See, e.g., M.A. v. E.A., 909 A.2d 1168, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)
(precluding a mother from bringing a claim on behalf of her minor daughter against the child’s
stepfather because the statute permitted only persons over eighteen or emancipated minors to
bring claims against household members); Strother v. Strother, 34 P.3d 736, 737 (Or. Ct. App.
2001) (overturning a protection order sought by a mother on behalf of her minor child against the
child’s father because the statute did not offer protection to minors against parents).
392. Neilson ex rel. Crump v. Blanchette, 201 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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implicitly indicates that minors themselves must have standing to seek relief as
well.393
C. Adult Standing to Seek Protection on Behalf of Teens Should Not Be
Interpreted to Deprive Teens of Standing
Courts may also interpret ambiguous protection-order statutes to deny adults
standing to seek protection orders on behalf of minors. Thus, as with grants of
standing to minors, it is important that states unequivocally accord adults
standing to file on behalf of minors.
The extent to which adults are accorded standing to seek protection orders
benefitting minors is a separate inquiry from whether minors are accorded the
capacity to seek protection orders on their own.394 In practice, however, those
two issues may be conflated incorrectly, with courts interpreting an explicit
grant of standing to adults to deprive standing or capacity to minors.395 In
Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
recognized the distinct nature of these inquiries and held that the state
protection-order statute’s language authorizing an adult to file a petition for a
protection order on behalf of minor family or household members did not
deprive a minor of the right to file a petition for a protection order on his own
behalf.396 To mitigate this potential for confusion, however, legislatures must
specifically articulate the extent to which adults are accorded standing to seek
relief on behalf of minors and the extent to which minors are accorded standing
and legal capacity to represent their own interests in protection-order
proceedings.
D. Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Interpreted to Accord Capacity to Minors,
as Permitted by Other Law
Several legal principles also support extending legal capacity to teens to
represent themselves in protection-order proceedings when statutes are
ambiguous or silent on the issue. First, because teens are more likely to seek
protection orders if they are empowered to represent their own interests in
court proceedings, the principle of liberal construction supports extending legal
capacity to teens when statutes are ambiguous.397
Furthermore, statutes and court rules governing capacity in over half of
states grant courts the discretion to determine whether a minor party is able to
represent herself or whether the appointment of an adult representative is
393. Cf. Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 575–76 (interpreting the broad language
of the West Virginia statute permitting the filing of petitions for protection orders by any
“person” or adult family or household members on behalf of minor family or household members
to accord standing to minors).
394. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
395. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
396. Katharine B.T., 640 S.E.2d at 575–76.
397. See supra notes 370–76 and accompanying text.
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required.398 In accordance with its laws regarding capacity, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota has affirmed that trial courts have the discretion in minors’
civil protection-order proceedings to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude
that no guardian is necessary, thus permitting the minor to proceed alone.399
Applicable laws in other states indicate that court appointment of guardians ad
litem for minor parties is discretionary, not mandatory.400 Likewise, in the
twenty-four states that follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), a court
may permit a minor party to proceed on her own, without involving a parent or
another adult representative, if the court determines that the minor’s interests
will be adequately protected.401 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)
addresses the procedures to be applied in federal court when an action is
brought by a minor or incompetent person402 and explicitly permits general
guardians, committees, conservators, or like fiduciaries to sue on behalf of
minors.403 Minors lacking one of these enumerated representatives “may sue
by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian

398. Several states accord minor parties ages fourteen and older the right to select their adult
representatives, subject to court approval. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5203 (2005
& Supp. 2010); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373(a)–(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-5-301(1)–(2) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.050(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-03-01 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.08.050 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.01(b)(2)–(3) (West 1994 & Supp. 2010); ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(d); MICH.
CT. R. 2.201(E)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202(a)(1) (McKinney 1997); OR. R.
CIV. P. 27(A)(1); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(d)(3); UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(c). Several other states require
adults to represent the interests of minor parties in all court proceedings, without exception. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-103(a) (2005); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 683(A)–(B)
(2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 507.110 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-307
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.01(3)(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2010);
IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.210; KY. R. CIV. P. 17.03(1); MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02;
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2011); OR. R. CIV. P. 27(A); PA. R. CIV. P. 2027;
UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(b).
399. Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 870–71 (S.D. 1997).
400. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-132(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (giving
courts discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem in probate proceedings); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 464-A:41 (LexisNexis 2007).
401. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17(c) (2006); KAN STAT. ANN. § 60-217(c) (West 2005);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2017(c) (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-17(c) (2011);
ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(c); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 17(c); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 17(g); COLO. R. CIV. P. 17(c);
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 17(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210(b); HAW. R. CIV. P. 17(c); IDAHO R. CIV.
P. 17(c); ME. R. CT. CIV. P. 17(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 17(b); MISS. R. CIV. P. 17(c); MONT. R. CIV.
P. 17(c); NEV. R. CIV. P. 17(c); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-017(c); N.D. R. CIV. P. 17(b); OHIO
R. CIV. P. 17(B); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(c); TENN. CT. R. ANN. 17.03; VT. R. CIV. P. 17(b); WYO. R.
CIV. P. 17(c); see also Jeruss, supra note 261, at 875–78, 905–10 (comparing state procedural
rules to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)). But see Katherine B.T., 640 S.E.2d at 577
(holding that West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) requires that “a minor must have either
a next friend or guardian in order to prosecute or defend civil actions generally”).
402. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).
403. Id.
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ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or
incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”404
Although Rule 17(c) may be characterized as mandating the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for minor parties who appear in court without an adult
representative, courts repeatedly have interpreted Rule 17(c) to accord judges
broad discretion to protect unrepresented minors’ interests in litigation by
appointing—or not—adult representatives as they deem appropriate.405 As
explained by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
We spell out the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)] to mean: (1)
as a matter of proper procedure, the court should usually appoint a
guardian ad litem; (2) but the [c]ourt may, after weighing all the
circumstances, issue such order as will protect the minor in lieu of
appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may even decide that
such appointment is unnecessary, though only after the [c]ourt has
considered the matter and made a judicial determination that the
infant is protected without a guardian.406
Cases interpreting Rule 17(c) provide little guidance regarding the factors a
court should evaluate to determine whether a minor’s interests are adequately
protected without the appointment of a guardian ad litem.407 As an alternative,
the jurisprudence analyzing whether pregnant minors are entitled to judicial
bypass of parent-notification requirements under state abortion laws provides a
model of how the issue might be resolved.408 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme
Court held that a court must permit a minor to obtain an abortion without
securing parental consent or notifying a parent if the minor establishes her
maturity or if the court determines that bypassing the consent or notification

404. Id. 17(c)(2).
405. See, e.g., Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parsons, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating
that “under Rule 17(c), a court may appoint a guardian, or it may decline to do so if the child’s
interests may be protected in an alternative manner”); M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th
Cir. 1977) (noting that the “[a]ppointment of a guardian ad litem is considered to be discretionary
under the Federal Rules, provided the District Court enters a finding that the interests of the minor
are adequately protected in the event it does not make such appointment”).
406. Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958).
407. The few cases addressing this issue hold that a minor party’s interests were adequately
protected without an appointed guardian because another adult accompanied the minor to court
proceedings. See, e.g., Cowden v. Ramsey, 154 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993)
(affirming judgment entered in favor of a minor and holding that the minor’s interests were
adequately protected in the litigation, despite the court’s failure to appoint a next friend or
guardian ad litem, because the minor’s aunt litigated the case and the minor’s mother was present
throughout the proceedings).
408. See Brumley, supra note 369, at 348–49 (arguing that courts should apply the text used
in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), which permits a minor to avoid parental notice and
consent requirements in seeking an abortion if she demonstrates her maturity, when assessing
whether a minor should have a right to sue over parental objection regarding an issue normally
reserved to parental discretion under constitutional law).
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requirement is in the minor’s best interest.409 Determining that a minor is
sufficiently mature to represent her own interests or that representing herself
will serve a minor’s best interests would likewise justify extending legal
capacity to minors in the protection-order context.
Although one court has recognized that “[n]o definitive list of criteria can be
adopted to determine maturity,”410 courts considering whether a minor is
sufficiently mature to be granted a judicial bypass have focused on evaluating
a minor’s demeanor, life experience, perspective, and judgment.411 In
evaluating a minor’s demeanor, courts observe “a minor’s composure, analytic
ability, appearance, thoughtfulness, tone of voice, expressions, and [the
minor’s] ability to articulate” her reasons for being before the court.412 In
assessing a minor’s life experience, courts consider a minor’s experience with
employment, living away from home, and handling personal finances,413 as
well as a minor’s educational background, extracurricular activities, and
grades.414 Courts weighing a minor’s perspective consider the minor’s level of
appreciation and understanding of the relative gravity and possible detrimental
impact of each available option to her, as well as the minor’s ability to assess
realistically the possible short- and long-term consequences of each option.415
Courts evaluating a minor’s judgment assess the minor’s conduct, in light of
her circumstances.416 A minor’s autonomous decision to seek a judicial waiver
of parent notification itself may be indicative of good judgment.417 Courts
assessing whether bypassing a notification or consent requirement is in a
minor’s best interest, regardless of her maturity, evaluate factors such as the
risks posed to a minor’s safety and the potential disruption to the stability of a
minor’s home life.418
Each of these factors would similarly weigh in favor of granting a minor
legal capacity to represent her interests in a protection-order proceeding.
Minors who have the wherewithal to recognize that they need protection from
409. 443 U.S. at 643–44.
410. In re Doe 2, 166 P.3d 293, 295 (Colo. App. 2007).
411. See, e.g., H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Utah 1986) (focusing on a
minor’s experience, perspective, and judgment); Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269, 1274
(Ala. 2001); In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 792 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (focusing on
demeanor); In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 290–91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (considering experience,
judgment, and perspective of a minor); In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(gauging a minor’s good judgment); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2000) (examining
numerous factors in assessing a minor’s maturity).
412. Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d at 1274.
413. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. at 954.
414. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 257.
415. In re B.S., 74 P.3d at 290–91.
416. See In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d at 793.
417. Id.
418. See, e.g., In re Doe 2, 166 P.3d 293, 296 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069,
1075 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 282.
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an abusive partner and independently approach the court for help typically
possess sufficient maturity to represent their interests in related court
proceedings. In addition, permitting a minor to seek a protection order
independently will nearly always serve her interests in safety and
well-being,419 particularly if a minor will elect not to seek legal protection if
she must involve a parent or another adult in the litigation.
In sum, ambiguity regarding teens’ rights to standing and capacity in
protection-order statutes tends to result in the exclusion of teens from the
protection-order remedy.420 To maximize teens’ access to protection orders,
states must explicitly articulate minors’ rights to standing and legal capacity in
protection-order statutes. In the interim, courts interpreting ambiguous statutes
may be empowered to extend their protections to teens based on the principles
of liberal construction, children’s rights of access to the courts, public policies
authorizing adolescents to make autonomous decisions governing their safety,
health, and well-being, and assessments of teen petitioners’ maturity and best
interests.421
VI. CONCLUSION
To offer teens meaningful legal protection from abuse, state legislatures
must draft statutes in a manner that facilitates teens’ access to civil protection
orders. Protection-order statutes must clearly and unconditionally grant abused
teens standing and legal capacity to seek protection orders, without requiring
parent notification or involvement. At a minimum, protection-order statutes
must specifically articulate the circumstances under which minors have
standing and capacity to seek protection orders. To best protect teens,
protection-order statutes should confer standing without regard to age, and
legal capacity on persons ages twelve and older. Furthermore, states should
extend protection-order statutes to encompass individuals in romantic, dating,
or sexual relationships, as well as to individuals subjected to sexual assault or
stalking. Moreover, courts should be authorized to appoint attorneys to
represent minor petitioners who need assistance pursuing their claims. Adults
should be accorded standing to seek protection orders on behalf of minors who
they know are or fear to be experiencing abuse, and courts should be required
to consider the wishes of minor petitioners when adults seek protections on
their behalf. Protection orders should be available against minor perpetrators
ages twelve and older, and safeguards should be put in place to ensure that
courts treat minor respondents in an age-appropriate manner at hearings and in
any subsequent enforcement proceedings. In short, by expanding the reach of
civil protection-order statutes to encompass the abuses experienced by teens

419. See supra notes 312–14.
420. See supra Part V.A.
421. See supra Parts V.B, V.D.
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and encouraging eligible teens to come forward and seek relief, these reforms
will maximize abused teens’ ability to access justice.
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APPENDIX
A model protection-order statute for protecting teens would include the
following provisions:
(1) In the definitions section:
(a) A minor is an unemancipated individual under the age of 18.
(b) A petitioner is any individual, regardless of age, who alleges that he
or she:
(i) has been subjected to abuse or a criminal offense, or has been
threatened with a criminal offense by a respondent:
(A) with whom the petitioner is or was related by blood,
marriage, or having a child in common;
(B) with whom the petitioner has or had a romantic, dating, or
sexual relationship; or
(C) with whom the petitioner shares or has shared a common
residence; or
(ii) has been stalked or sexually assaulted by a respondent.
(c) A respondent is any individual aged 12 and older who is alleged to
have abused, committed, threatened to commit a criminal offense
against, stalked, or sexually assaulted a petitioner.
(2) In the section outlining the procedures for seeking a protection order:
(a) A petitioner, or a person authorized by this section to act on a
petitioner’s behalf, may file a petition for civil protection in the
[appropriate court] against a respondent.
(b) If the petitioner is a minor, the petitioner’s parent, guardian,
custodian, or another adult may file a petition for civil protection on the
petitioner’s behalf.
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(c) A minor petitioner who is 12 years of age or older may file a
petition for civil protection and represent his or her own interests in
related proceedings without the involvement of a parent, guardian, or
another adult.
(d) A minor who is less than 12 years of age may file a petition for civil
protection and participate in related proceedings only if his or her
parent, guardian, or custodian, or another adult files the petition on the
minor’s behalf and represents the minor petitioner’s interests in related
proceedings.
(e) The court may appoint an attorney to represent a minor petitioner or
minor respondent if necessary to protect the minor party’s interests, and
if doing so will not unduly delay the issuance or denial of a protection
order.
(f) In a hearing under this section, if a parent, guardian, custodian, or
other adult has filed a petition for civil protection on behalf of a minor
petitioner 12 years of age or older, the court shall consider the
expressed wishes of the minor petitioner in deciding whether to issue an
order pursuant to this section and in determining the contents of such an
order.
(g) Enforcement proceedings under this section in which the respondent
is a juvenile [as defined in applicable juvenile delinquency laws and
rules] shall be brought in [the division of the court with jurisdiction
over juvenile delinquency proceedings] and shall be governed by
[applicable juvenile delinquency laws and rules].
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